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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(j) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Defendants agree with Plaintiff's "Issue For Review" in this
case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the present case, Defendants agree with Plaintiff's
statement of the "Standard of Review."
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES
In the present case, Defendants assent that the cases and
statutes cited in Plaintiff's "Determinative Statutes and Cases"
are relevant and must be considered.

In addition, Defendants

incorporate four other cases which also must be heeded, Thimmes
v. Utah State University, 417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah Ct. App.
2001), Holland v. Career Services Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993), Anderson v. Public Serv. Com'n of Utah., 839 P.2d
822 (Utah 1992), Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied
Science v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982).

Copies are

attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants generally agree with the underlying facts of
Plaintiff's "Statement of the Case."

However, although the facts

are correct, Plaintiff has stated the facts in a biased manner.

1

Not only has he mischaracterized certain events, he has addressed
irrelevant subject matter.

Specifically, the stated facts

surrounding the attorney planning meeting are not only irrelevant
to whether or not Plaintiff directed and delivered his notice of
claim to the county clerk, but misstated as well.

As stated in

Plaintiff's Brief, the planning meeting was scheduled for
September 7, 2 0 00, and although it did have to be rescheduled
Defendants had continuous contact with Plaintiff.1

It was

improper for Plaintiff to even include such facts as they are not
available on the appellate record.

Further, it must be

emphasized that Plaintiff acknowledged here that he
directed

and delivered

never

his notice of claim to the Kane County

Clerk.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The bottom line in this case, is that Plaintiff did
strictly

not

comply with the statutory requirements of the Utah

Counsel represents there was contact with Plaintiff's counsel
during the time frame in which Plaintiff contends that Defendants'
counsel ''failed to return calls". See Appellant's Brief at p. 3.
Defendants recognize that this is information not available in the
record, but feel compelled to make reference to it in light of
Plaintiff's Brief. Also, the correspondence regarding the attorney
planning meeting which Plaintiff has included in his Addendum C is
improper as it is not a part of the appellate record. Moreover,
Defendants must note, regarding Plaintiff's contention that
Defendants incurred more than the necessary expense, it would have
incurred more expense to have held an attorney's planning meeting
before the court had ruled on the motion to dismiss, since the
meeting was ultimately unnecessary as the court dismissed
Plaintiff s claim.
2

Governmental Immunity Act (hereinafter, "Immunity Act"), thus,
the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim was not only
proper, but required.
In his brief, Plaintiff has admitted that he failed to
direct and deliver the notice of claim to the county clerk as
required by the Immunity Act, yet he continued to try and color
his actions as substantial compliance.

However, Plaintiff's acts

do not rise to the level of substantial compliance.

In fact,

Plaintiff has conceded that he directed and delivered his notice
of claim to the Kane County Commissioners.

He never

even

attempted to direct and deliver the notice to the clerk of Kane
County.

Rather, Plaintiff has attempted to argue that although

he did not follow the explicit language of the statutes and
directed and delivered his notice of claim to the county clerk,
fortuitously for him, it was eventually received by the county
clerk's office, and that such inaction constitutes substantial
compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Plaintiff is

wrong in this argument.2

defendants must address Plaintiff's allusion that Kane County
incurred excessive expense in filing motions addressing Plaintiff's
noncompliance with the rules. Here, Kane County retained counsel
as they were being sued by Plaintiff, it was counsel's duty to
ensure that Plaintiff followed the rules as to his lawsuit.
Plaintiff's mistakes were the cause for Defendants motions. First,
Plaintiff misfiled the case in Washington County. Plaintiff should
have filed the suit initially in Kane County and then moved the
court to change venue. However, since he did not, Defendants made
a motion to dismiss and the court, ordered sua sponte,
that venue
(continued...)

3

This is a simple case as it is clear that the rule regarding
the notice requirements of the Immunity Act is that of strict
compliance.

As in this case, where the Immunity Act is clear on

its face as to whom the notice of claim should be directed and
delivered to, there is no need to interpret: and manipulate
legislative intent.

The statute specifically states that, when

bringing a claim against a county, the notice of claim must be
directed

and delivered

to the county clerk.

One must only read

the statute to determine the proper notice requirements.

Now,

Plaintiff has made a desperation argument to this Court in an
effort to cure the fact that he failed to read and follow the
explicit instructions of the statute
Plaintiff has also submitted that he met the overall purpose
of the Immunity Act, and that Defendants should have been
estopped from moving for dismissal.

2

Again, Plaintiff is wrong in

(„ .continued)
be changed and stated that "proper venue of this action is clearly
in Kane County, not Washington County, and any transfer from Kane
County to Washington County . . . must be made by a district court
judge in Kane County.
To this extent, Defendants are entirely
correct."
See R. at 51, Order Changing Venue, attached hereto as
Addendum B. Second, Plaintiff did not follow the Immunity Act's
notice requirements, and of course Defendants moved the court to
dismiss Plaintiff's suit as the court lacked jurisdiction. See R.
at 54-115. While Plaintiff argues that Defendants' motions were u a
detriment of the taxpayer,"
(see Appellant's Brief at p.4»
interestingly
the courts recognized
legal
soundness of the
substance of Defendants' motions and ordered venue to be changed
back to Kane County and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. See
R. at 49-52, Addendum B, See R. at 121-127, Order Granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, attached hereto as Addendum C.
4

his argument as estoppel is generally inappropriate to assert
against governmental entities.
Further, this Court has been very explicit in declaring that
strict compliance is the law.

In fact, as recently as March,

2001, it has been proclaimed so.
on which he reaches to rely.

Plaintiff has only three cases

However, one case is wholly

inapplicable as it deals with a completely different statute than
the one at issue.

The other two cases are easily distinguished

from the case at hand, and in fact, are supportive of Defendants'
position.

In both cases, it was stated that strict compliance is

the law and that only because of very specific facts, did the
court reach what seems to be a more flexible holding of the law.
Plaintiff's reliance on these cases and facts is misplaced.
Finally, Plaintiff has argued that this Court should now
adjust the law to make it one of "substantial compliance."
Again, this Court has declared over and over again that strict
compliance is the law and Plaintiff has not offered any
compelling reason to deviate from what has advanced justice for
over twenty-five years.

Additionally, after the clarifying 1998

amendments were made, the statute stated explicitly whom one
should direct and deliver a notice of claim to, thus, allowing
anything short of strict compliance would annul the purpose of
the changes.

Furthermore, this is not the correct forum in which

5

to seek an adjustment of the statute.

Any change must be

legislatively mandated.
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff's claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and this Court should affirm
its holding.
ARGUMENT

I,

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE HE
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT'S
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-13 and 63-30-11 explicitly state, in

relevant part:
§ 1 3 : A claim against a political
subdivision, or against its employee . . .,
is barred
unless notice of claim is filed
with the governing
body of the political

subdivision according

to the requirements

of

Section
63-30-11
within one year after the
claim arises, . . .
§ 11: (b) The notice of claim shall be:

(ii) directed

and delivered

to:

(B) the county clerk,
when the claim is
against a county; (Emphasis added).
See Appellants' Addendum A
This Court has consistently held that strict compliance of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is required.

Rushton v. Salt

Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999), (see Scarborough v.
Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1972) (This
Court stated "[w]e have consistently held that where a cause of
action is based upon a statute, full

requirements

is a condition

precedent
6

compliance

with

to the right

its

to maintain

a

suit."
u

(Emphasis added)).

Further this Court has held that,

[a]ctual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet the

notice of claim requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act,"
Rushton, at 1201, and that even in "situations where a
governmental agency may be given actual notice of a party's
claim, the party must still file a notice of claim in full
compliance with the statute in order to pursue its claim."

Great

West Casualty v. UT Dept. of Transportation, 415 Utah Adv. Rep.
26 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
Further, this Court has held that when interpreting a
statute, the plain language is first examined.

State v. Vigil,

842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992), Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
u

This Court stated that

[w]e will resort to other methods of statutory interpretation

only if we find the language of the statutes to be ambiguous."
Vigil, at 845.

In Bellonio, regarding § 13 of the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act, the Court of Appeals of Utah found
they need look no further than the statute's plain language.
Bellonio, at 1296.

"The plain meaning of section 13 is that a

claim against a political subdivision is 'barred' unless notice
is filed with the 'governing body,' which is enumerated in § 633 0-11, within one year of the claim arising."

Id.

As recently

as this year, courts have already declared twice, that the notice
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act are to be strictly
7

construed and full compliance with its requirements is a
condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit.

Thimmes v.

Utah State University, 417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah Ct- App. 2001),
Great West Casualty.3
Plaintiff's Delivery Of His Notice Was NOT Legally Sufficient Nor
Did It Amount To Substantial Compliance.
In his Brief, the basis for Plaintiff's appeal was that the
trial court was wrong to dismiss his case because he
substantially complied when his notice was received by employees
of the county clerk's office, thus allowing Defendants an
opportunity to properly and timely investigate the merits of the
case.

Plaintiff's argument is premised on three cases, Brittain

v. State by and through Utah Department of Employment, 882 P.2d
666 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), Bischel v. Merit, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995), and Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480
(Utah 1980).

However, Plaintiff's reliance on the above cases is

misplaced and the facts are distinguishable to the facts of the
case at hand.
In Brittain, the court determined that where the plaintiff
directed and delivered their notice of claim to Risk Management

3

It must be noted that in the Great West Casualty decision,
Judge Orme expressed frustration that any change to the state's
"immunity scheme" cannot be resolved in this forum, and is an issue
for the legislature, not the courts. See Appellees' Argument II in
this Brief.
8

and the attorney general, the requirements of § 63-3 0-12 were
satisfied. At the time of Brittain's holding, § 12 provided:
A claim against the state, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the attorney general and the
agency concerned within one year after the
claim arises. Brittain, at 669 (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993)
However the court the court in Bellonio distinguished Brittain in
one respect, because it was a case involving § 12 rather than §
13.

Bellonio, at 1297.

The case was further distinguished by

the court's reasoning that while the court found it "reasonable"
to construe Risk Management as the "agency concerned" as set
forth in § 12, § 13 contained no language that the city's legal
counsel was entitled to the notice.

Id.

In Bischel, the court found a notice of claim sufficient
where the plaintiff directed and delivered notice to the county
attorney as opposed to the county commission.

The plaintiff did

not know who to serve, so she called the commission to ask.

In

response, the plaintiff was instructed to direct and deliver her
notice to the Salt Lake County Attorney.

It must be noted that

at the time of Bischel, the notice requirements of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act were more ambiguous than they are under
the present code.

When Bischel was decided, § 13 stated only

that a claim against a political subdivision "is barred unless

9

notice is filed with the governing

body

of the political

subdivision within one year after the claim arises."
277 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993).

Bischel, at

There was no

reference to § 11 to specify who the governing body was.

The

court stated in its distinguishment, that,
Thus, the end result in Bischel was not based
upon a substantial compliance or constructive
notice theory, but rather was founded upon
the apparent agency of the commission
employee. Bischel at 1298.
In Stahl, the statute at issue was not even the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

Rather, the issue was whether or not

the plaintiff had fulfilled the thirty day notice as required by
the Utah Public Transit Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-20-56.
at 480-81.

Stahl,

This Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss

because the Utah Public Transit Act did not contain an express
bar against maintaining an action for noncompliance and found the
plaintiff's substantial compliance sufficient.

Id. at 481-82.

This Court declared that "generally a direction in a statute to
do an act is considered "mandatory" when consequences are
attached to the failure to act.

Id. at 481-82.

Taken

conversely, this statement means that the legislature intended to
bar actions for noncompliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act's notice requirements.4
4

It must be noted that Stahl, a 1980 case, is neither binding
or controlling, nor is there any case regarding the issue at hand
(continued...)
10

A binding and more factually similar case is that of
Bellonio.

In Bellonio, the plaintiff argued that constructive

notice, coupled with substantial compliance was sufficient but
the court disagreed.

Bellonio, at 1296.

In the Bellonio case,

the plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking terrace at the Salt
Lake Airport on June 14, 1992.

Bellonio's first attorney

informed the insurance carrier that he was plaintiff's counsel,
this information was forwarded to Robert M. Kern, the airport's
legal counsel.

Mr. Kern instructed that any further

correspondence should come to his office.

Id. at 1295.

Bellonio retained a second attorney who engaged in a number
of correspondences between the plaintiff and Mr. Kern, and then
on March 24, 1993, directed and delivered a notice of claim to
Mr. Kern.

Mr. Kern acknowledged receipt and indicated that he

was awaiting further reports.

On July 11, Bellonio directed and

delivered his notice of claim to the Utah Attorney General, the
Salt Lake City Attorney, and the Airport Director, but not upon
Salt Lake City's Mayor or the Salt Lake City Council.

Id.

On June 14, 1993, Bellonio's third attorney filed a
complaint against Salt Lake City and the Airport.

The trial

court dismissed Bellonio's claim against the airport but not
against Salt Lake City.

The City brought an interlocutory appeal

4

(...continued)
where t h e c o u r t s r e l y on i t .
11

seeking dismissal because Bellonio failed to strictly comply with
the notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

Id.

As in this case, Bellonio attempted to rely on Brittain and
Bischel and argued that since Mr. Kern had told him to direct all
correspondence to him, that dismissal would be inappropriate.
However the court relied on the fact that while the airport's
attorney did request that all communication be sent to him, he
never indicated that he was the proper agent to receive the
notice of claim.

The court further held that Bischel was not

persuasive because Mr. Kern was never the agent of the mayor of
the city or the council.

Regarding Bellonio's reliance on

Brittain and Bischel, the court declared that:
[w]hile . . . it may seem to indicate a
flexible rule of constructive notice to
governmental entities, this is not
the
general
rule in this state.
Bellonio, at 12 97
(emphasis added).
Further, the court set forth:
[T]he precedential effect of [these] cases is
limited by their unique factual underpinnings
and therefore, neither
should be construed
as
an indication
that we are prepared
to
abrogate
the longstanding
rule
requiring
strict
compliance
with all aspects
of the
Governmental
Immunity Act.
Id. (emphasis
added).
The court also noted that Bellonio "never even

attempted to

direct his notice of claim to the proper party, i.e., the mayor

12

of the city council."

Bellonio, at 1298.

In their holding, the

court found that Bellonio's claim was barred since he did not
file the required notice of claim set forth in § 63-30-13.
Another acutely applicable case is that of Thimmes,

In

Thimmes, the plaintiff was not sure who to direct and deliver her
notice to, so she called the Utah Attorney General's Office.
Plaintiff contended that someone at the Attorney General's office
instructed her to direct and deliver her notice of claim to Risk
Management.

Id.

In Thimmes the plaintiff argued that Bischel

applied because she was instructed by a state agent to direct and
deliver her notice of claim to Risk Management.

However, the

court found that the "[a]ppellant ha [d] not presented sufficient
evidence to justify her reliance on the advice of an unnamed
state employee rather than the plain language of section 63-3 012."

Id.

The court noted that:
[T]he [Utah Governmental Immunity] statute
gives explicit directions. Any confusion
over who should receive the notice was
created by Appellant when she elected to rely
on advice from an unnamed state employee,
rather than the plain language of the
statute.

Thimmes, at 5.

The court also declared again, that in their

decision in Bellonio, that u[w]e pointed to the unique factual
circumstances of Bischel and said our decision in that case
should not be viewed as an 'abrogat[ion of] the long-standing
rule requiring strict compliance with all aspects of the

13

Governmental Immunity Act."'

Id. (citing Bellonio, at

1297)(emphasis added).
In the instant case, the explicit language of §§ 63-30-11
and 63-30-13 states that the notice of claim must be directed
delivered

to the county

clerk

when a county is being sued.

Appellants' Brief, Addendum A.

and
See

Plaintiff has offered in his

Brief that in correspondences dated August 3, 1999, and September
24, 1999, he directed and delivered his notice of claim twice

to

the wrong governmental body, the Kane County Commissioners:
Stephen Crosby, Joe C. Judd, and Norman Carroll.
Brief at p. 3, Addendum C.5

See Appellants

Plaintiff conceded in his opposition

memorandum to Defendants' Motion to dismiss that he "does not
deny that he failed to properly file a notice of claim."
at 114.

See R.

Nor did Plaintiff ever even attempt to direct and

deliver his notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk.

Further,

Plaintiff never inquired of anyone whether or not his notice was
sufficient.

Based on these facts and as a matter of law, Judge

Mower dismissed Plaintiff's claim as the court did not have
jurisdiction.

See R. at 121-127, Addendum C.

Plaintiff has also alluded that since Defendants' counsel
stipulated in another case that he would not raise the argument
that Defendants did not have an opportunity to properly and

5

Again, Plaintiff has referenced and incorporated improperly
that which is not available on this record.
14

timely investigate the merits of the case, that now Plaintiff's
noncompliance should be overlooked.

First, Plaintiff's

contention in this regard is wholly irrelevant to the issue at
hand.

Second this argument is improper and inappropriate as it

is not part of the appellate record in this case, and is a
complete mischaracterization of counsel's stipulation.6
Kane County is well aware of the court decisions enunciating
the policy purpose of the notice requirements to allow a
governmental entity to investigate and settle a claim.

The

reason for the stipulation in the Bear River Insurance Co. v.
Kane County case was in recognition of the fact that Kane County
does not intend to advance any argument that under facts of this
case or any related cases, that it did not have an adequate

6

In his Brief, Plaintiff stated that he would "supplement this
in [his] reply brief' (see Appellant's Brief at p. 8 ) . However,
Defendants contend that such argument is not only irrelevant, as
argued above, but procedurally incorrect.
The Utah Rules Of
Appellate Procedure specifically state that " [r]eply briefs shall
be limited to answering new matter set forth in the opposing
brief." Utah R.App.P. 24(c). If Plaintiff addresses this in his
Reply Brief he will be raising new issues not raised in either the
original or Appellee Brief, which will put Defendants in a
detrimental situation as they will not be able to respond.
The
stipulation that Plaintiff refers to took place on May 1, 2001 and
Plaintiff did not file his Brief until May 4, 2001.
Plaintiff
should have addressed it fully in his original brief or at least
supplemented it since that point allowing Defendants to respond.
Now, Defendants can only argue in anticipation and point out in
advance that none of what Plaintiff refers to is in this record.

15

opportunity to investigate the merits of the claims.7

However,

it is Kane County's position that this argument is not relevant
to the issue before this Court and whether or not Plaintiffs are
in full compliance with the Immunity Act insofar as notice is
concerned.
Additionally, this argument ignores the fact that there are
an unlimited number of circumstances where a county may, as a
practical matter, be in a position so as to evaluate a claim for
which it has knowledge, and yet the claimant has utterly failed
to comply with the Immunity Act.

For example, sending and

serving a notice of claim on the attorney representing Kane
County would certainly allow Kane County to have knowledge of a
potential claim and presumably investigate, but clearly the
notice would be insufficient.

See Bellonio.

Here, Plaintiff's argument that he substantially complied
with the compulsory notice requirements of the Immunity Act by
directing and delivering his notice of claim to the Kane County
Commissioners is farcical.

First, Plaintiff's actions cannot

amount to substantial compliance -- how can Plaintiff's actions
equate substantial compliance when he never addressed his notice
of claim to the county clerk or even made an attempt to ensure

7

The facts of the Bear River case are completely different from
the facts at hand, and Plaintiff has failed to recognize that
perhaps the stipulation was justified and based on the specific
facts of that case.
16

that the county clerk received the notice pursuant to the
requirements of the statute?

Just as the court stated in

Thimmes, in this case as well, any confusion over who should have
received the notice was created by Plaintiff.

He simply should

have read the plain language of the statute and directed and
delivered his notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk.

Kanab,

the county seat, is a small town, the Kane County Clerk is a
public official who has an office open to the public.

It would

have been very easy for Plaintiff to inquire as to who the county
clerk was. Second, assuming arguendo, that Plaintiff's actions
did constitute substantial compliance, this Court has made it
clear in Rushton that strict

compliance is the rule and that even

Defendants' actual notice of Plaintiff's lawsuit pursuant to the
clerk auditor's signature and acceptance for the notice of claim,
which was not addressed to the Kane County Clerk, is ineffectual
and does not usurp his responsibility to properly direct and
deliver the notice to the Kane County Clerk.
For the reasons above, the trial court was correct in
finding that Plaintiff did not comply with the statutory notice
requirements, which resulted in the proper dismissal of his
claim.

17

Estoppel CANNOT Be Invoked Against Kane County.
Plaintiff has argued that the Defendants should have been
"estopped from asserting the failure to file the notice of claim
. . ."

See Appellant's Brief at p. 6.

Generally, estoppel may not be invoked against governmental
entities. Thimmes, at 5, Mendez v. State Dept. of Social
Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

It has been

well settled that estoppel is only assertable against
governmental entities in "unusual situations in which it is
plainly apparent that failing to apply the rule would result in
manifest injustice.''

Holland v. Career Services Review Bd. , 856

P.2d 678, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (see, Anderson v. Public Serv.
Com'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992), Utah State
University of Agriculture and Applied Science v. Sutro & Co., 646
P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982) . The court went on to declare that
M i ] n such cases, 'the critical inquiry is whether it appears
that the facts may be found with such certainty, and the
injustice to be suffered is one of sufficient gravity, to invoke
the exception.'" Holland, at 682 (citing Utah State University,
at 720). The court also noted that the this Court in Anderson
declared that u[t]he few cases in which Utah courts have
permitted estoppel against the government have involved very

specific

written

representations

by authorized government
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entities."

Holland, at 682 (citing Anderson, at 827) (emphasis

added).
In light of the general rule precluding the invocation of
estoppel against governmental entities, and the clear and plain
language of §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-13, while Plaintiff has
asserted that Defendants should be estopped, they never relied on
any representations, written or otherwise, that their notice of
claim was sufficient.

Further, Plaintiff never established the

required presence of "manifest injustice."

All Plaintiff's

reasoning and argument cannot gloss over the fact that he did not
strictly comply with the notice requirements.

For these reasons,

this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal.
II.

STRICT COMPLIANCE IS THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
In Plaintiff's second issue on appeal, he has argued that

this Court should now overturn the long standing law of strict
compliance and find substantial compliance adequate.

The

gravamen of Plaintiff's appeal is that if a governmental body has
knowledge of a compliant and adequate time to investigate it,
regardless of how or who the notice of claim is directed and
delivered to, then notice should be effective.
In the landmark case of Scarborough, this Court explicitly
stated that:
We have consistently held that where a cause
of action is based upon a statute, full
compliance
with its requirements is a
19

condition precedent to the right to maintain
suit.
Scarborough, at 4 82 (emphasis added).

Further, and even more

recently, the Utah Court of Appeals announced again
that strict compliance is the rule.

in Thimmes

Thimmes, at 5.

Additionally, in a recent decision concerning § 13, the Utah
Court of Appeals in Great West Casualty recognized that the
judicial forum is not the place to adjust the strict compliance
rule and refused to do so.

The court stated:

[s]uch an adjustment in the philosophy
underlying our State's sovereign immunity
scheme must, however, come at the hands of
the Legislature and not this Court. Great
West Casualty, at 27-28.
For over twenty-five years, from Scarborough in 1975 to
Great West Casualty and Thimmes in 2 001, the courts have
recognized and respected a rule of strict compliance of all
aspects of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, specifically the
notice requirements.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act has

evolved from a substandard substantial compliance rule to a more
effective, strict compliance standard, which has become a rule
affording and promoting justice and equity as § 63-30-13
explicitly sets forth requirements as to whom notice should be
directed and delivered to, as well as the consequences for
failure to follow them.
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Plaintiff's argument that the purpose of the 1998 amendment
of § 13 was "to address the previous ambiguity of who was to be
served on the 'governing body' so that the primary purpose
(notice of the governing body) would be fulfilled[.]" (See
Appellant's Brief at p. 17) is exactly on point.

Here, the 1998

amendment cleared up any ambiguities about whom to direct and
deliver a notice of claim to, thus with such clear-cut
instructions there is even more reason for courts to adhere to
their strict application of the notice requirements.
The purpose of the 1998 change was to clarify, without
thought, what the term "governing body" meant.

Now, it would

defeat the whole purpose of the clarifying amendment for this
Court to carve out exceptions.

Courts have gone back to strict

compliance because they recognize the slippery slope that such
exceptions would create.

Once courts start allowing exception,

upon exception, upon exception, where would it stop and what
would be the point of having the act without enforcing any of the
requirements?

With no defining end, the very thing the 1998

amendments were implemented for would be negated.

The

legislature has made these clarifying changes so that courts
would not have to carve out exceptions, thus it would not be
proper for further changes to come from the another forum other
than the legislature.
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As stated above, in decisions that seem to make the rule
more flexible, it has been declared that:
[w]hile . . . it may seem to indicate a
flexible rule of constructive notice to
governmental entities, this is not the
general
rule in this state.
Bellonio, at 1297
(emphasis added).
Further, the court set forth:
[T]he precedential effect of [these] cases is
limited by their unique factual underpinnings
and therefore, neither
should be construed
as
an indication
that we are prepared
to
abrogate
the longstanding
rule
requiring
strict
compliance
with all aspects
of the
Governmental
Immunity Act.
Id. (emphasis
added).
Strict compliance has been declared the law in order ensure
that the proper entities know when they are being sued, so they
are able to prepare for litigation.

If the courts had to

determine in each and every case whether notice requirements had
been substantially complied with, our already limited judicial
resources would be wasted.
In this case, Plaintiff has admitted that he did
and deliver

not

his notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk.

direct
Thus,

and as argued above, Plaintiff has not even substantially
complied with the compulsory notice requirements.

No matter how

Plaintiff tries to color his actions as sufficient, his efforts
have been wholly inadequate under all twenty-five (25) years of
existing jurisprudence. Yet now, in a last ditch effort he is
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reaching to this Court to overturn a well defined and mandated
rule to establish sufficiency in order to reverse the trial
court's decision and remand the issue for trial.

For the

foregoing reasons and since this Court is not the proper forum in
which to adjust the strict compliance rule, the strict compliance
standard must be upheld, making anything less absolutely
deficient.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff did not strictly comply with the
requirements set forth in § 63-30-13 and directed and delivered
his notice of claim with the Kane County Clerk within the one
year statutory time period, the trial court was required

to

dismiss Plaintiff's claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court was

correct in dismissing Plaintiff's suit and its decision must be
upheld.
DATED on this P\

day of May, 2001.
STIRBA Sc HATHAWAY

By:
PETER STIRBA
AIMEE K. MARTINEZ
Attorneys for Appellees
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM A

rrovo, uan

future. Following those equivocal answers, follow-up
questions revealed that resolving the mother's
problems would take a "significant amount of time,"
and that the father felt the children "deserve a lot
more than I can give them right now." Then,
Appellants both unequivocally agreed that
relinquishment and adoption into a loving and stable
environment was in the children's best interests.
Given this testimony, the family's extensive history
with the Division of Child and Family Services, and
the nature of Appellants' personal problems, we
conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that termination of parental
rights was in the children's best interests
f 8 Appellants finally assert that they were denied
effective assistance of counsel. In their briefs on
appeal, Appellants' only argument oh this issue is a
terse assertion, without citation to the record or any
legal authority, that counsels' "superficial and cursory
examination of [Appellants]" constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel because it prevented them from
both expressing their true feelings and demonstrating
"on record that [they] had an adequate
understanding" of the proceeding and its
consequences. Rule 24(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure requires that all arguments
contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on.1' Id Because Appellants have
failed to cite to the record and any legal authority in
support of their ineffective assistance claim, we could
properly refuse to consider it. See State v. Thomas,
1999 UT 2,111,974 P.2d 2<59.
\9 In any w e n t , the argument fails on its merits.
Appellants firsf raised their ineffective assistance
claim in their post- judgment motion under Rule
60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3 To
establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,
an appellant must show that "counsel's performance
was objectively deficient and that counsel's deficient
performance prejudiced the case." In re Eli., 880
P.2cl 11, 13 (Utah Ct. % p . 1994). Appellants' only
contention in their briefs on appeal is that counsels'
examinations of Appellants during the relinquishment
proceeding were inadequate. Even assuming that
counsels' examinations were objectively deficient,
Appellants were not 'prejudiced. The record
establishes that the requirements ofsection 78-3 a-414
were met. In additioti, Appelldnts were given an
opportunity to ask questions at the hearing, and they
we're asked to explain in their own words why
termination of parental rights and adoption was in the
children's best interests. Thus, the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' Rule
60(b) motion. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110,t9, 2 P.3d 451
(establishing abuse of discretion as the proper
standard of review for denial of Rule 60(b) motions).
flO
We affirm the juvenile court's orders
terminating Appellants' parental rights and denying
their post-judgment motions.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
til

WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding
Judith M. Billings, Judge

UTAH

1. At oral argument, Appellants cited In re D.L.S., 332
N.W\2d 293 (Wis. 1983). The court in In re D.L.S.,
however, merely applied the Wisconsin statutory
requirements for voluntary relinquishment of parental
rights, which include an explicit right to a jury trial if
requested by the relinquishing parent. See id, at 296 n.5. In
re D.LS. does not stand for the proposition that due process
requires a court to comply with Rule 11 in yoluntary
relinquishment cases
2. Although a conclusion on the best interest of the children
is included in the juvenile court'sfindingsof fact, such a
determination is "more properly labeled a conclusion of
law "In re SLA 999 UT App 390 at 130 n.6.
3. Rule 60(b)(6) is "sufficiently broad" to permit a court to
set aside a judgment for ineffective assistance of counsel
Stewart v Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 158, 506 P.2d 74, 76
(1973)
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Amanda THIMMES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, Haven B.
Hendricks, and John Does I-X,
Defendants and Appellees.
NO.991099-CA
FILED: 03/15/01
2001 UT App 93
First District, Logan Department
The Honorable Gordon J. Low
ATTORNEYS:
Randall K. Edwards, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brent A. Burnett Salt T ake
City, for Appellees
Before Judges Benph, Davis?/and Thome*
Thizopinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
I BENCH, Judge:
K1 Appellant argues that the trial court erred when'it
granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss after
! concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case
j because of Appellant's failure to properly serve a
notice of claim on the Utah Attorney General. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
\2 On March 17, 1997, Appellant was struck by a
vehicle operated by Appellee Haven B. Hendricks, an
employee of Appellee Utah State University.
\ Appellant prepared a complaint against Appellees for
damages resulting from the accident. Pursuant to t^e
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, AppelWftt
prepared two notices of claim to be served in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 {1997).l
An employee of Appellant's attorney sent one notice
of claim to Utah State University and called the

fCE REPORTS

'ode-Co
tovo, Utah

Thimmes v. Utah State University
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Office of the Utah Attorney General (Attorney in part: "A claim against the state... is barred unless
General) to inquire as to whom the other notice notice of claim is filed with the attorney general and
;hqj#cf 1)e sent. After being transferred, the employee the agency concerned within one year after the claim
jpdke to an unidentified person who allegedly told arises " Id. (emphasis added). Section 63-30-12 does
ler to send the notice to the Division of Risk not contain the same ambiguities as to whom the
Vlanagement. The employee mailed a notice of claim notice of claim should be directed as sections
to the Division of Risk Management on February 6, 63-30-11 and -13. An individual making^claim
against the State need not infer which governmental
1998.
J3 In January 1999, Appellant filed her complaint entity should be served with notice—the statute gives
against Appellees in the First District Court. The explicit directions. Any confusion over who should
Attpfriey General subsequently filed a Motion to receive the notice was created by Appellant when she
Dismiss, alleging that the office had not been elected to rely on advice from an unnamed state
properly served with a notice of claim pursuant to employee; rather than the plain language of the
section 63-30-12. The trial court held a hearing and statute.
granted the motion to dismiss. Appellant filed a f 7 Appellant would also have us conclude that the
motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. Division of Risk Management is an office of the
This appeal followed.
Attorney General because an assistant attorney
ISSUE AND STANDABJD OF REVIEW
general maintains an office -there. However, in
f 4 The issue before us is whether the trial court Straley^ we recognized that while notice^to the
properly dismissed Appellant's complaint after Division of Risk Management may be "sufficient to
finding that^he had not complied with the notice of comply with .. . [the] requirement that the notice of
claim requirements in section 63-30-12. "The grant claim also be filed with the agency concerned,... it
of amotion forjudgment on the pleadings is reviewed cannot sufficefor the Immunity Act's requirement that
under the same standard as the grant of a motion tp notice be filed with the Attorney General." Straley,
dismiss, i.e., We affirm the ^rant of such a motion 2000 UT App 38 at ^\6 n.9 (internal citation omitted)
onljr if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not (emphasis added).
recover under the facts alleged."1 Straley v. Halliday, f 8 Finally, Appellant contends that this case falls
2000 UT App 38,^, 997 P.2d 338(quoting Golding within the exception to the general rule that
v.Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 19% P.2d 897, 898 "precludes the assertion of estoppel against the
(Utah 1990)). The grant of amptjogto dismiss is thus government." Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646
a matter of laW, which "we review for correctness." P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). The exception to this
Id.
general rule, however, applies only in cases where
ANALYSIS
"the facts may be found with such certainty, and the
%5 Appellant relies on Bischel v. Merritt, 907 F.2d injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to
L
275 <Utah€t. App. 1995) to support her contention invoke the exception*" Id. The exception requires "a
that ^he complied with the requirements for filing a high standard of proof * and has only applied in cases
nqfice of claim. However, We^ conclude that the J involving "very specific written representations by
circumstances in Bischelzre^ilj distinguished from authorized government entities." Anderson v. Public
this case. In Bischel, we recdgnized the established Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992). No
rule of strict compliance with the notice provisions of written representation was involved in this case, and
tire Utah Governmental Immunity Act! See id. at 279. Appellant cannot even name the state employee on
We also acknowledged ambiguities in Utah Code whose advice she relied. Appellant does not allege,
Ann. §§63-30-11,-13 (1993) because they did not and we can find no indication of, willful misconduct
"prescribe a specific manner or method for filing on the government's part nor an intent to hinder
notice with the governing body of the political Appellant's pursuit of her claim. Thus, we conclude
subdivision." Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278. Specifically, that Appellant falls far short of meeting the high
we concluded that "direction and delivery of the standard of proof required for us to apply estoppel in
notice must be inferred from the phrase, 'notice of this case. >
claim is filed with the governing body of the political
CONCLUSION
subdivision within one year after the claim arises.1" K9 Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence to
Id. (Quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993)). justify her reliance on the advice of an unnamed state
Because the statute did not specify to whom Bischel employee rather than the plain language of section
was to direct her notice of claim, we concluded that 63-30-12. Appellant did not strictly comply with the
she could rely on representations of an employee of notice requirements of section 63-30-12 because she
the county attorney's office that she could direct her failed to serve notice of her claim on the Attorney
notice to that office. S&e id. In Bellonio v Salt Lake General within the specified time period. Therefore,
City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) we the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
explained the effect of Bischel on the general rule Appellant's claim and we affirm the dismissal of her
requiring strict compliance with the Governmental complaint.
Imrriunity Act. We pointed to the unique factual
circumstances of Bischel andsaid our decision in that
Russell W. Bench, Judge
case should not be viewed as an "abrbgatpon of] the
long-standing rule requiring strict compliance withall 1J10
WE CONCUR:
aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act,"
Bellonio, 911 P.2d at 1297.
James Z. Davis, Judge
K6 In this case, Appellant's clairh is against the State,
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge
««* 4U* nntmtv Thic rase is therefore governed by

State v. One 1980 Cadillac
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allegations.
1. At the time Appellant's claim arose, section 63-30-12 f4 No further action was taken in this matter until
required that notice be served on "the attorney general and May 27, 1998, when the state moved for summary
the agency concerned," Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (1997). judgment. After Keebler opposed the motion, the trial
Subsequently, section 63-30-12 has been revised to require court denied summary judgment because the use of
that a notice of claim be served only on the Attorney the seized currency was in dispute. Subsequently,
General. See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (Supp. 2000).
while still incarcerated, Keebler moved for final
disposition of the matter.
1(5 A scheduling conference was held on December
Cite as
8,1998, at which Keebler appeared via telephone. At
417 Utah Adv. Rep. 6
that time, the court scheduled a bench trial for March
23,1999. About one month before the scheduled trial
IN THE SUPREME COURT
date, Keebler petitioned the trial court for an order
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
requiring the State of Utah to bear the cost of
transporting him to appear and testify at the trial.
STATE of Utah,
However, the trial court did not act on the motion and
Plaintiff and Appellee,
the bench trial was held as scheduled. Keebler, still
v.
incarcerated, was not present or represented at the
ONE 1980 CADILLAC and Three Thousand, Six trial.
Hundred, Seventy Six Dollars U.S. Currency,
f 6 After trial, the court made findings of fact that at
Defendant,
the time of Keebler's arrest, he possessed and was
Rick Dee Keebler,
transporting large quantities of narcotics for illegal
Appellant.
d i s t r i b u t i o n , i n c l u d i n g 8 p o u n d s of
methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of cocaine, 5 ounces of
No. 990382
heroin, and 11.5 pounds of marijuana. The trial court
FILED: 03/16/01
found that Keebler actually admitted his intent to
2001 UT 26
break the narcotics down into small quantities and sell
them illegally for an anticipated return of $175,000.
Sixth District, Sevier County
In addition, the trial court found that Keebler
The Honorable David L. Mower
I
admitted he had previously purchased and distributed
for profit other illegal narcotics, including 2 pounds
ATTORNEYS;
|
of methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of cocaine, 2 ounces
R. Don Brown, Richfield, for plaintiff
of heroin, and 6 pounds of marijuana. Based on these
Rick Dee Keebler, Leavenworth, Kansas, pro se
findings of fact, the court concluded that the 1980
Cadillac was being used to transport narcotics and
This opinion is subject to revision before final
that the currency constituted proceeds of narcotics
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
distribution in violation of the Utah Controlled
Substances Act. The trial court ordered that the 1980
DURHAM, Justice:
Cadillac and the $3676 be forfeited to the state.
^ 1 Appellant Rick Dee Keebler ("Keebler") appeals
f7 On appeal, Keebler raises three claims of error.
pro se from the trial court's judgment, pursuant to the
He argues that (1) the trial court's judgment
Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann.
constitutes double jeopardy because Keebler's
§58-37-13(1998), ordering forfeiture of his 1980
Cadillac and $3676 in United States currency to the conviction on federal drug charges is based on the
same conduct relevant to the forfeiture proceeding,
State of Utah* We affirm.
I (2) the trial court's judgment violates Keebler's right
BACKGROUND
%2 On September 20, 1994, while driving a 1980 j to due process of law because the state did not bear
Cadillac in Sevier County, Utah, Keebler was stopped the cost of transporting him to Utah to appear at the
by the Utah Highway Patrol for a traffic offense. A trial and did not appoint counsel to represent him, and
search of the vehicle revealed that Keebler was (3) the trial court did not have subject matter
transporting large quantities of controlled substances, jurisdiction in the forfeiture proceeding because
including methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and Keebler was convicted under federal jurisdiction and
marijuana. The officer arrested Keebler and seized the was not charged under the Utah Controlled
1980 Cadillac and $3676 cash found in Keebler's Substances Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
possession. Keebler was subsequently charged and
^[8
The
trial
court's judgment contained no express
convicted under federal drug charges. Throughout
this litigation, he has been incarcerated and continues conclusions of law with regard to Keebler's claims of
error. However, the inference _ inherent in the
to serve as an inmate in federal prison.
%3 On September 30, 1994, the State of Utah filed a judgment is that the trial court found no merit to
complaint and notice of seizure and forfeiture in the Keebler's constitutional and jurisdictional arguments.
Sixth Judicial District Court in Sevier County. In the Keebler's constitutional arguments regarding double
complaint, the state alleged that the 1980 Cadillac and jeopardy and due process present questions of^law.
the $3676 were being used or intended for use to State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousandjftight
facilitate the transportation, receipt, possession, Hundred Dollars, United States Currency, and One
and/or concealment of illegal narcotics in violation of Scale, 942 P.2d 343,346 (Utah 1997) (citing Ryan v.
the Utah Controlled Substances Act. Therefore, the Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah
state urged forfeiture of Keebler's property. Keebler 1995)). Subject matter jurisdiction is also a question
answered the complaint and denied the state's of \w. Barnard v. Utah State Bar,857P.2d 917,919
I (Utah 1993) (citing Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

856 P.2d 678, Holland v. Career Service Review Bd., (Utah App. 1993)
*678 856P.2d678
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Kevin, HOLLAND, Petitioner,
v.
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, State Office
of Education, and
Department of Human Resource Management,
Respondents.
No. 920486-CA.
June 30, 1993.
Laid off employee sought review of decision of
Career Service Review Board (CSRB) denying
grievance he filed against Utah State Office of
Education and Department of Human Resource
Management (DHRM).
The Court of Appeals,
Russon, Associate P.J., held that: (1) DHRM did not
abuse its discretion in determining that employee was
not eligible for automatic reappointment to graphic
arts specialist 19 position with Office of Education,
and (2) CSRB properly rejected employee's equitable
estoppel claim.

Pagel

unfettered discretion as administrative code provides
mandatory procedures with regard to reduction in
force (RIF) employees. U.C.A.1953, 67-19-8.
[3] Officers and Public Employees <@^11,4
283 —
2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure
2831(B) Appointment
283k 11 Restrictions of Civil Service Laws or
Rules
283kll.4 Eligible Lists, Certification, and
Selection.
Individuals listed on statewide reappointment
register are granted hiring preference so long as they
meet minimum qualifications for position and have
previously attained same salary range as vacant
position.

[1] Officers and Public Employees <@^11.8
283 —
2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure
2831(B) Appointment
283kll Restrictions of Civil Service Laws or
Rules
283kll.8 Other Matters.
Court of Appeals will review Department of Human
Resource Management's (DHRM) application of its
rules for reasonableness and rationality. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4).

[4] Officers and Public Employees ©^11.4
283 —
2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure
2831(B) Appointment
283kll Restrictions of Civil Service Laws or
Rules
283kll.4 Eligible Lists, Certification, and
Selection.
Department of Human Resource Management's
(DPRM) application of rule governing granting hiring
preference to individuals listed on statewide
reappointment register was reasonable and rational
where laid off employee's previous employment did
not have same salary range as vacant position and,
therefore, DPRM did not abuse its discretion in
determining employee was not eligible for automatic
reappointment to graphic arts specialist 19 position
with Office of Education; salary range of employee's
previous employment as apprentice graphic arts
camera specialist with Division of State Printing had
midpoint of $10.84 per hour and maximum of $12.67
per hour and salary range of graphic arts specialist 19
position had midpoint of $10.94 per hour and
maximum of $13.06 per hour.

[2] Officers and Public Employees <®^11.4
283 —
2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure
2831(B) Appointment
283kll Restrictions of Civil Service Laws or
Rules
283kll.4 Eligible Lists, Certification, and
Selection.
Certification
of employees'
eligibility
for
reappointment is within sole province of Department
of Human Resource Management (DHRM);
however, certification is not subject to agency's

[5] Estoppel <®=^62.2(2)
156 —
156DI Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or
Public Officers
156k62.2 States and United States
I56k62.2(2) Particular State Officers, Agencies
or Proceedings.
Since doctrine of equitable estoppel involves
principles of general law, Court of Appeals will
review Career Service Review Board's (CSRB)

Affirmed.
Bench, J., filed concurring opinion.
West Headnotes
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conclusion as to employee's claim for equitable
estoppel for correctness, granting no deference to
agency's decision.
[6] Estoppel <@=*52.15
156 —
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k52.15 Essential Elements.
To invoke equitable estoppel, there must be
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with claim later asserted, reasonable
action or inaction by other party taken on basis of first
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act,
and injury to second party that would result from
allowing first party to contradict or repudiate such
statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
[7] Estoppel <®^62.2(1)
156 —
156DI Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or
Public Officers
156k62.2 States and United States
156k62.2(l) State Government, Officers, and
Agencies in General.
Doctrine of equitable estoppel is only assertable
against state or its institutions in unusual situations in
which it is plainly apparent that failing to apply rule
would result in manifest injustice.
[8] Estoppel <®^62.2(2)
156 —
156DI Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or
Public Officers
156k62.2 States and United States
156k62.2(2) Particular State Officers, Agencies
or Proceedings.
Career Service Review Board (CSRB) properly
rejected laid off employee's equitable estoppel claim
that he was entitled to reinstatement at grade 19 on
State Classified Pay Plan where he never received any
"specific written representation" that he was entitled
to reinstatement at grade 19, where he could not have
reasonably relied on statement contained in Work
Force Adjustment Plan that his previous position was
"approximately grade 19" as he did not see statement
until after his grievance procedure began, where he
did not rely on reinstatement at grade 19 since he
applied for both grade 17 and grade 19 positions, and
listed grade 17 as minimum position he would accept,
where he did not show an injury resulting from
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Department of Human Resource Management's
DHRM correction of its earlier misstatement and
where fact that DPRM put him on reinstatement
register for an additional three months after mistake
was discovered, as well as fact that CSRB
subsequently put him on register for three more
months supported finding of no manifest injustice.
*679 J. Elent Holland and Gordon J. Swenson, Salt
Lake City, for petitioner.
Jan Graham and Stephen G. Schwendiman, Salt
Lake City, for respondents.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and RUSSON, JJ.
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge:
Kevin Holland seeks review of a decision of the
Career Service Review Board of the State of Utah
denying a grievance filed by Holland against the Utah
State Office of *680 Education and the Department
of Human Resource Management. We affirm.
FACTS
Holland was employed as an apprentice graphic arts
camera specialist with the State Printing Office from
January 1985 until May 1990. In May 1990, Holland
was laid off as part of a reduction in force (RIF).
Holland was offered a bindery operator position and
another position involving inventory and press work at
no reduction in pay, but he declined these offers. At
the time of the RDF, his position was on the State's
Trade and Craft Pay Plan, and not on the Stale's
Classified Pay Plan. However, the Work Force
Adjustment Plan associated with the RIF listed bis
position as "approximately [Gjrade 19 [on the
classified pay plan]." The mid-point of his salary
range was $10.84 per hour and the maximum was
$12.67 per hour.
On May 22, 1990, Holland signed a Reappointment
Option Form, which stated: "I understand that I am
eligible only for those career service positions which
are of the same or lower grade as the last career
service ... position held and for which I meet
minimum qualifications as determined by the Division
of Personnel Management." He listed Grade 19 as
the minimum grade level that he was willing to
accept, but later changed this to Grade 17.
Holland was placed on the statewide reappointment
register for a period of one year, and applied for
various positions during the next several months, but
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was unsuccessful in securing employment. In January
1991, a Graphic Arts Specialist 19 position with the
Office of Education became available, and Holland
applied for it. The mid-point of the position's salary
range was $10.94 per hour and the maximum was
$13.06 per hour.
On the January 11, 1991,
reappointment register, Holland's last position was
listed, but no grade level was included because it was
not on the State's Classified Pay Plan. The minimum
grade level he was willing to accept was listed as
Grade 17.
On February 19, 1991, an interview panel of the
State Office of Education interviewed six applicants
for the position, one of whom was Holland. The
results of the interview scores were tabulated, and
Holland received the second highest score. The
applicant who received the highest score was hired for
the position. Holland was not considered an applicant
with reappointment rights because the midpoint and
maximum of the salary range of his previous position
were lower than those of the Education position, and
because his previous position required only one year
of prior experience, whereas the Education position
required four years of experience. Holland filed a
grievance with the Career Service Review Board on
March 13, 1991, claiming that he should have been
hired for the position because of his status on the
reappointment register.
On May 22, 1991, Holland was informed by the
executive director of the Department of Human
Resource Management that because of inadequate
communication and delay, he would be placed on the
reappointment register for an additional three months.
The executive director further informed Holland that
his previous position would be listed as Grade 18 on
the classified pay plan.

*681 REAPPOINTMENT DETERMINATION
Standard of Review
[1J The Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA) is applicable to all proceedings commenced
on or after January 1, 1988. Utah Code Ann. §
6346b-22(2) (1989). We therefore review Holland's
petition under post-UAPA law.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b46(4) (1989) provides:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

(h) the agency action is:

(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency....
In construing this section, the Utah Supreme Court
has previously held that appellate courts "will ...
employ an intermediate standard (one of some, but not
total, deference) in reviewing [the petitioner's] claim
that [the agency] erred in applying its rules." Union
Pac. R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876,
879 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted); accord SEMECO
Indus,, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d
1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, we review the agency's application of its
rules for reasonableness and rationality. See Union
Pac. R.R., 842 P.2d at 879.
Analysis

A hearing officer of the Career Service Review
Board conducted an administrative hearing on
November 15, 1991, and denied Holland's grievance.
Holland then appealed to the Career Service Review
Board, which sustained the hearing officer's decision
and denied Holland's appeal.
Holland seeks review of that decision, claiming that:
(1) the Office of Education and the Department of
Human Resource Management violated mandatory
rules regarding priority in hiring from the statewide
reappointment register, thereby impairing his rights as
a RIF'd employee; and (2) the Career Service
Review Board improperly rejected his equitable
estoppel claim. (FN1)

Holland claims that the Office of Education and the
Department of Human Resource Management
(DHRM) violated his rights as a RIF'd employee by
not following mandatory rules regarding priority in
hiring.
Specifically, Holland argues that the
respondents did not comply with Rule R468-5-4 of the
Utah Administrative Code, which provides, in
pertinent part:
R468-5-4. Order of Selection For Career Service
Positions.

5-4. (3) Third, appointment shall be made from
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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the statewide reappointment register containing the
names of employees who meet the minimum
qualifications for the position and who have
previously attained the same salary range as the
vacant position.
Utah Code Admin.P. R468-5-4.
(3) (1991).
Holland contends that DHRM incorrectly determined
that he was not eligible to be considered as an
applicant with reappointment rights for the Graphic
Arts Specialist 19 position with the Office of
Education, thus violating his reappointment rights
under Rule R468-5-4. The respondents reply that
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-8 (Supp.1992) grants DHRM
broad discretion to certify employees* eligibility for
reappointment, and therefore, DHRM's determination
must be upheld. (FN2)
[2] Section 67-19-8 states that "[t]he following
functions shall be performed by the department and
may not be contracted or otherwise delegated to
another state agency ... (4) maintenance of registers
and certification of eligible applicants...." Thus,
according to the plain language of that section,
certification
of
employees'
eligibility
for
reappointment is within the sole province of DHRM.
[3] However, it does not follow that such
certification is subject to the agency's unfettered
discretion. The Utah Administrative *682
Code
provides mandatory procedures which must be
followed with regard to RIF'd employees. As noted
by Holland, pursuant to Rule R468-5-4. (3) of the
Utah Administrative Code, individuals listed on the
statewide reappointment register are granted hiring
preference so long as they "meet the minimum
qualifications for the position and ... have previously
attained the same salary range as the vacant position,
Utah Code Admin.P. R468-5-4. (3) (1991)
(emphasis added). (FN3)
[4] In the present case, the salary range of Holland's
previous employment as an apprentice graphic aits
camera specialist with the Division of State Printing
had a mid-point of $10.84 per hour and a maximum of
$12.67 per hour. By comparison, the salary range of
the Graphic Arts Specialist 19 position with the Office
of Education had a mid-point of $10.94 per hour and a
maximum of $13.06 per hour. Applying the clear and
unambiguous language of Rule R468-5-4. (3) to the
facts of this case, Holland's previous employment did
not have the same salary range as the vacant position.
Thus, DHRM's application of that rule was
reasonable and rational. Accordingly, we conclude
that DHRM did not abuse its discretion in determining
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that Holland was not eligible
reappointment under that rule.

for

automatic

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
[5] Holland argues that the Career Service Review
Board (CSBJ3) improperly concluded that his claim for
equitable estoppel was without merit. Since the
doctrine of equitable estoppel involves principles of
general law, we review CSRB's conclusion for
correctness, granting no deference to that agency's
decision. See Questar Pipeline Co, v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991); Savage
Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670
(Utah 1991).
[6] The elements necessary to invoke equitable
estoppel are:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted;
(2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party
taken on the basis of the first party's statement,
admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to
the second party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act.
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d
671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted).
[7] Moreover, it is well settled that equitable
estoppel is only assertible against the State or its
institutions in unusual situations in which it is plainly
apparent that failing to apply the rule would result in
manifest injustice. See, e.g., Anderson v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992); Utah
State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah
1982); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979); Eldredge,
795 P.2d at 675. In such cases, Mthe critical inquiry
is whether it appears that the facts may be found with
such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception/ Utah
State Univ., 646 P.2d at 720; accord Anderson, 839
P.2d at 827; Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 675. Further, as
noted by our supreme court in Anderson, "[t]he few
cases in which Utah courts have permitted estoppel
against the government have involved very specific
written representations by authorized government
entities." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827 (emphasis
added).
[8] Applying the above law to the facts of this case,
Holland's claim fails. As a preliminary matter, it is
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important to note that Holland never received any
"specific written representation*' that he was entitled
to reinstatement at Grade 19 on the State Classified
Pay Plan. See id. The sole written representation
that his previous position was even "approximately
*683 [G]rade 19" was contained in a Work Force
Adjustment Plan that Holland did not see until after
his grievance procedure began.
Furthermore, that document is insufficient to give
rise to an equitable estoppel claim. First, the facts are
not such that Holland can establish with sufficient
certainty that equitable estoppel applies.
See
Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827; Utah State Univ., 646
P.2d at 720. Even if we accept that the first element
of equitable estoppel, a statement by one party that is
inconsistent with a claim later asserted, is present
here, there is no evidence that Holland reasonably
relied to his detriment on that statement as to meet the
second element of that doctrine. As noted above, at
the time of his alleged reliance, Holland had not seen
the work adjustment plan that listed his previous
position as "approximately [G]rade 19," and thus, he
could not have reasonably relied upon that document
at that time. Further, the evidence before CSRB
showed that Holland did not rely on reinstatement at
Grade 19, since he applied for Grade 17 positions as
well as Grade 19 positions, and listed Grade 17 as the
minimum position he would accept.
Also, as to the third element of equitable estoppel,
Holland has not shown an injury resulting from
DHRM's correction of its earlier misstatement, since
the fact that he did not qualify for reinstatement into
the Graphic Arts Specialist 19 position, not the
misstatement on the work force adjustment plan, was
the cause of his alleged injury. Because Holland was
never qualified for reinstatement into a Grade 19
position, he did not have arightthereto, and DHRM's
refusal to reinstate him into such a position cannot be
viewed as causing him injury. (FN4)
Additionally, Holland has not established the
"manifest injustice" requirement of Utah State Univ.
v. Sutro <fc Co. and its progeny. See Utah State
Univ., 646 P.2d at 718; accord Anderson, 839 P.2d
at 827; Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 675.
This is
especially true in light of the fact noted above that the
statement that his previous position was
"approximately [G]rade 19" was not the cause of his
injury, if any injury existed at all. Furthermore, the
fact that DHRM put him on the reinstatement register
for an additional three months after the mistake was
discovered, as well as the fact that CSRB
subsequently put him on the register for three more
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months after that, weighs in favor of finding no
manifest injustice. Thus, we conclude that CSRB did
not err in determining that Holland's claim for
equitable estoppel was without merit.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that (1) the Department of
Human Resource Management did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Holland was not eligible
for automatic reappointment to the Graphic Arts
Specialist 19 position with the Office of Education;
and (2) the Career Service Review Board properly
rejected Holland's equitable estoppel claim.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BILLINGS, J., concurs.
BENCH, Judge, concurring:
I concur. I write separately to clarify that there is
more than one possible standard of review when relief
is requested under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. As the main
opinion correctly points out, the supreme court has
adopted a deferential reasonableness standard when
reviewing an agency's "application" of an
administrative rule to the facts. See Union Pacific
Railroad Co. v. State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 876,
879 (Utah 1992). "Reasonableness," however, is not
the only possible standard of review under subsection
16(4)(h)(ii). Where a petitioner asserts that the
agency's action is contrary to the agency's rule
because the agency incorrectly interpreted the rule,
we apply a correction-of-error standard, unless the
agency has *684 been granted discretion to interpret
related statutory terms. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 593 n. 62 (Utah 1991).
In Union Pacific, the supreme court only addressed
the standard for reviewing an agency's "application"
of a rule to the facts. It was not presented with a
claim that the agency had departed from its own rules.
Nevertheless, the court gratuitously stated that since
"courts should uphold agency rules if they are
reasonable and rational, courts should also uphold
reasonable and rational departures from those
rules...." 842 P.2d at 879 (citation omitted). The
apparent discrepancy between this broad statement
and other supreme court holdings should be clarified.
It does not logically follow that an agency has
discretion to violate its own rules simply because it
had discretion to make those rules. The supreme
court itself has declared that agencies must follow
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their own rules.
[Administrative regulations are presumed to be
reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or
followed by the agency to suit its own purposes.
Such is the essence of arbitrary and capricious
action.
Without compelling grounds for not
following its rules, an agency must be held to them.
Department of Community Affairs v. Merit System
Council 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980).
The misleading language in Union Pacific
contradicts the language of subsection 16(4)(h)(ii)
itself, which expressly states that relief may be
granted if agency action is "contrary" to agency rule.
The legislature did not direct that relief may be
granted only if the agency action is "unreasonably
contrary" to agency rule. Reasonable or not, a
departure from an agency rule is by definition
"contrary" to the rule.
Inasmuch as a departure from a rule effectively
constitutes a rule change, the supreme court's dicta
also contradicts the Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act. The Act anticipates that once an agency adopts a
rule it must abide by the rule, unless it exercises its
rulemaking authority to amend the rule. See sections
63-46a-3(8), and -9(2) (regarding nile amendments).
Any agency subject to the Administrative
Rulemaking Act promulgating a rule must follow the
procedures specified. See Williams v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986)
(interpreting the Utah Rule Making Act, the
predecessor to the Administrative Rulemaking Act).
The Administrative Rulemaking Act requires rule
making whenever "agency actions affect a class of
persons" Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(3)(a) (1986),
and defines a rule as "a statement made by an
agency that applies to a general class of persons,
rather than specific persons ... [which] implements
or interprets policy made by statute...." Id. at §
63-46a-2(8).
Ellis v. State Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 882, 887
(Utah App. 1988). See also Lane v. Board of Rev. of
Indus. Comm'n, 111 P.2d 206, 208 (Utah 1986)
(agency rules are not valid and cannot "provide a
lawful basis" for agency decisions until the agency
complies with the rulemaking process).
The mere application of the law to the facts of a case
does not constitute rulemaking. Ellis, 757 P.2d at
887.
If, on the other hand, an agency seeks to
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change "clear law" so as to develop a new rule of law
that will have general application, it may do so only
through the rulemaking process. See Williams v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 776 (Utah 1986)
(quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §
7:25, at 122 (2d ed. 1978)).
Clarifying
"interpretations" of rules that have general application
(and are therefore de facto new rules) may be made
through administrative adjudication only if the law at
issue is "uncertain." Williams, 720 P.2d at 776.
Once an administrative ruling of law is made in a
formal adjudication, however, it constitutes stare
decisis and the agency is bound by it just as if it were
a formally adopted rule. Salt Lake Citizens Congress
v. Mountain States Tel & Tel, 846 P.2d 1245,
1252-53 (Utah 1992); see also Utah Code Ann. §
63-46a-3(6) (1989) ("Each agency shall enact rules
incorporating *685. the principles of law not already
in its rules that are established by final adjudicative
decisions within 120 days after the decision is
announced in its cases.").
Since an agency may "depart" from its established
rules only through the process outlined in the
Administrative Rulemaking Act, we cannot logically
defer to such departures, reasonable or not, when they
occur by means of agency adjudications.
Consequently, the supreme court's analytical dicta in
Union Pacific should not be confused with the actual
holding in that case, i.e., that an agency's application
of its rules is reviewed for reasonableness.
Since Holland is challenging only the CSRB's
application of rule R468-5-4.
(3), (and not its
interpretation of the rule), I concur with the main
opinion's use of the reasonableness standard and agree
that CSRB's application of the rule was reasonable.
(FN1.) Holland also argues that the Career Service
Review Board violated his reappointment rights
under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-17 (1986), which
provides, in relevant part:
Any career service employee accepting an
appointment to an exempt position who is not
retained by the appointing officer ... shall:
(1) be appointed to any career service position for
which the employee qualifies in a pay grade
comparable to the employee's last position in the
career service....
However, this section is plainly inapplicable to
Holland because he never accepted an appointment
to an exempt position in which he was not retained
by the appointing officer. Accordingly, we decline
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to address this argument on review.
(FN2.) Additionally, the respondents argue that Utah
Code Admin.P. R468-12-3. (7)(a) (1991) also
grants DHRM discretion to determine a RIF'd
employee's eligibility for reinstatement. However,
since this argument is raised for the first time on
review, we do not address it. See, e.g., Aha Indus.
Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1291-92 (Utah 1993).
(FN3.) The parties do not dispute that Holland met
the minimum qualifications for the graphic arts
specialist position in question; thus, we limit our
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discussion of this rule to DHRM's application of the
term, "the same salary range."
(FN4.) Indeed, to hold otherwise would mean that
any employee that has been incorrectly graded on
the statewide reappointment register would
thereafter have a right to a position to which he or
she is, in fact, ineligible. Creation of such a rule
would have a substantial adverse effect on public
policy, and thus, would be an improper use of
equitable estoppel. See Utah State Univ., 646 P.2d
at 718.
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*822 839P.2d822
Supreme Court of Utah.
Clifford (Rusty) ANDERSON, dba Image Limousine,
Petitioner,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondent.
No. 910166.
July 1, 1992.
Authorized common carrier of passengers for hire
sought review of Public Service Commission order
revoking his certificate of convenience and necessity.
The Supreme Court, Durham, J,, held that: (1)
Commission adequately complied with notice and
hearing requirements; (2) Commission did not act in
an arbitrary and capricious manner in cancelling
certificate; and (3) Commission was not estopped
from revoking certificate.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure <@^M54
15A —
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak452 Notice
15Ak454 Sufficiency.
[See headnote text below]
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure ®^470
15A —
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak469 Hearing
15Ak470 Necessity and Purpose in General.
[See headnote text below]
[1] Carriers <@s*8
70 —
701 Control and Regulation of Common Carriers
701(A) In General
70k8 Licenses and Taxes.
Public Service Commission complied with statutory
notice and hearing requirements in hearing on order to
show cause why common carrier's certificate of
convenience and necessity should not be suspended or

Pagel

cancelled due to failure to maintain insurance;
licensee appeared at hearing and defended his
position, hearing was focused on violation for which
license was later suspended, and notice informed
parties of the nature of the potential penalty involved.
U.C.A.1953, 54-6-41; Const. Art. 1, § 7.
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure ©^454
15A —
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak452 Notice
15Ak454 Sufficiency.
[See headnote text below]
[2] Automobiles <S=^106
48A —
48 AIH Public Service Vehicles
48AIH(B) License and Registration
48Akl06 Revocation, Forfeiture, or Suspension
of License.
[See headnote text below]
[2] Constitutional Law ®^297
92 - ~
92X11 Due Process of Law
92k297 Regulation of Carriers and Public Utilities.
Public Service Commission's service of process on
licensed common carrier by certified mail satisfied
statutory and constitutional notice requirements;
Motor Carrier Act did not refer to any sort of
personal service or actual notice requirement.
U.C.A.1953, 54-6-14,
54-6-41;
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. 5, 14.
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure ®^454
15A —
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak452 Notice
15Ak454 Sufficiency.
[See headnote text below]
[3] Automobiles <@=*106
48A —48AHI Public Service Vehicles
48A1H(B) License and Registration
48Akl06 Revocation, Forfeiture, or Suspension
of License.
Utah Public Service Commission acted reasonably in
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choosing to serve process on common carriers by
certified mail, rather than by personal service;
carrier's interest lay in certificate of convenience and
necessity for operating a limousine service, which was
his source of livelihood and thus a significant interest,
whereas agency had an interest in controlling level of
its administrative burden in delivering orders to
parties. U.C.A.1953, 54-6-14, 54-6-41; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. 5, 14.
[4] Carriers <®^8
70 —
701 Control and Regulation of Common Carriers
701(A) In General
70k8 Licenses and Taxes.
Ongoing nature of relationship between Public
Service Commission and holders of certificate of
convenience and necessity to act as common carriers
made Commission's burden in effecting notice to
certificate holders less onerous than it might be
outside the regulatory setting.
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure ® ^ 4 5 4
15A -—
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak452 Notice
15Ak454 Sufficiency.
[See headnote text below]
[5] Carriers <@^8
70 —
701 Control and Regulation of Common Carriers
701(A) In General
70k8 Licenses and Taxes.
Public Service Commission's interest in ensuring
that parties did not delay or subvert administrative
process by willfully evading notice authorized placing
lower burden on agency in giving notice of possible
adverse actions, justifying service by certified mail
rather than personal service.
[6] Administrative Law and Procedure @^513
15A —
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak513 Administrative Review.
[See headnote text below]
[6] Carriers <®=*8
70 —
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701 Control and Regulation of Common Carriers
701(A) In General
70k8 Licenses and Taxes.
Public Service Commission did not act in an
arbitrary and capricious manner by amending
administrative law judge's recommendation that
penalty be suspended, concluding instead that the full
$500 fine was warranted and that certificate would be
revoked if the fine was not paid within 60 days, in
light of the carrier's history of past violations.
U.C.A.1953, 54-6*4(1).
[7] Estoppel <§=*62.2(2)
156 —
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or
Public Officers
156k62.2 States and United States
156k62.2(2) Particular State Officers, Agencies
or Proceedings.
Public Service Commission was not estopped from
revoking common carrier's certificate of convenience
and necessity on the theory that he had entered into an
alleged settlement agreement with an assistant
Attorney General; although record indicated there
was some negotiations between certificate holder and
assistant Attorney General regarding fines owed by
holder, certificate holder merely claimed in his
attorney's own letter that some sort of agreement may
have been reached, but did not point to specific
representation made by commission or by assistant
Attorney General.
*823 Joseph N. Nemelka, Murray, for Anderson.
R. Paul Van Dam, David L. Stott, Salt Lake City,
for Public Service Com'n.
DURHAM, Justice:
Petitioner Clifford Anderson (dba Image Limousine)
is an authorized common carrier of passengers for
hire.
He seeks review of a Public Service
Commission order revoking his certificate of
convenience and necessity. Anderson challenges the
Commission's order on the grounds that (1) the
Commission failed to comply with the notice and
hearing requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-41,
(2) the Commission acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner in cancelling Anderson's
certificate, and (3) the Commission is estopped from
revoking Anderson's certificate. We reject all of
petitioner's contentions and affirm the Commission's
order.
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I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Anderson has a fairly long history of appearances
before the Public Service Commission. His most
recent violation, for which the Commission
subsequently revoked his certificate, involved a failure
to maintain on file with the Commission proof of
insurance coverage, as required by Utah Code Ann. §
54-6-42, In August 1990, Image allowed its insurance
to lapse for twelve days. On October 18, 1990, an
administrative law judge conducted a hearing in which
Anderson was required to show cause why Image
"should not be subjected to sanctions and/or the
suspension or cancellation of its Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity" for its insurance lapse.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative
law judge recommended that Anderson be fined $500
for the insurance violation but that the fine be
suspended on the condition that Anderson pay a
suspended portion of a previously imposed fine within
180 days and that Anderson complete a two-year
probation without further violation. The Commission
reviewed the administrative law judge's proposed
order but found the penalty inadequate in light of
Anderson's history of violations. Consequently, on
November 9, 1990, the Commission overruled the
administrative law judge's proposed order. Instead,
the Commission ordered Anderson to "pay the
$500.00 fine within 60 days of the date of this order
or his Certificate of Convenience and Necessity will
be cancelled without farther notice. *
The Commission sent a copy of the November 9
order by certified mail to the address Anderson had
designated as that at which service of process may be
made and orders may be delivered. See Utah Code
Ann. § 54-6-14 (1990). The mail carrier made several
attempts to deliver the order, but Anderson failed to
claim his mail. Consequently, the post office returned
the order to the Commission unclaimed. Anderson
did not pay the $500 fine by January 9, and on
February 7, 1991, the Commission issued an order
revoking Image's certificate of convenience and
necessity. The Commission, again by certified mail,
sent Anderson a copy of the order of revocation. It
too was returned unclaimed.
On March 14,
statutory review
Commission for a
The Commission
subsequently filed
this court.

1991, after the expiration of the
period, Anderson petitioned the
rehearing of the cancellation order.
denied the petition.
Anderson
a petition for a writ of review with

*824 n. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Subsection 63-46b-16(4) of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("UAPA") outlines the circumstances
under which a reviewing court may grant relief from
formal agency action. Under 63-46b-16(4)(d), we
may grant relief if "the agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law."
Anderson's
allegation that the Commission failed to comply with
the notice and hearing requirements of section 54-6-41
falls under this rubric. Under UAPA, as in other
contexts, when reviewing an application or
interpretation of law we use a correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the Commission's
interpretation of the law. See Savage Indus, v. State
Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991). But
see Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991) (if
agency has been granted discretion in interpreting
specific term, we review agency's interpretation/
application
under
reasonableness
standard).
Anderson's second claim, that the Commission acted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it revised
the administrative law judge's proposed order, is
reviewable under subsection 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). We
review claims that an agency action was arbitrary and
capricious for reasonableness. See Sisco Hike v.
Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah
Ct.App.1988).
IE. NOTICE AND HEARING
Anderson contends that the Commission failed to
comply with the notice and hearing requirements of
Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-41, thereby depriving him of
due process in the revocation of his license. (FN1)
Section 54-6-41 states, "The commission may at any
time for good cause, and after notice and hearing,
suspend, alter, amend, or revoke any certificate,
permit, or license issued by it under this chapter. *
Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-41 (1990).
Although
Anderson admits he was afforded a hearing on the
matter mat led to the revocation of his certificate, he
argues that this hearing and the subsequent notices the
Commission sent him regarding the future status of
his license were insufficient to comport with the due
process standards inherent in section 54-6-41.
We first address Anderson's contentions that the
Commission did not conduct sufficient hearings before
cancelling Anderson's certificate. Anderson points
out that in the October 18, 1990 hearing, the
administrative law judge focused only on Anderson's
failure to maintain insurance coverage and not on
whether his license should be revoked. Anderson
argues that after the Commission amended the

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

839 P.2d 822, Anderson v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, (Utah 1992)
administrative law judge's recommended order and
before it revoked his certificate, the Commission
should have conducted another hearing directly
addressing whether his certificate should be revoked.
(FN2) His argument is merit less.
[1] After Anderson allowed his insurance to lapse,
the Commission sent him an order to show cause
(HOSC") requiring him to "appear before the
Commission and show cause why [Image's]
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity ... should
not be suspended or cancelled...."
The notice
provided to Anderson advising him of the OSC
hearing unambiguously informed him that the purpose
of the hearing was to determine why his certificate
should not be revoked. An administrative law judge
conducted a hearing on the OSC at which Anderson
appeared and defended his position. Such a hearing,
focusing on the violation for which a license is later
suspended and the notice which informs the parties of
the nature of the potential penalty involved, clearly
comports with the hearing requirement set forth in
section 54-6-41.
•825
[2] Anderson further alleges that the
Commission gave him insufficient notice of its
modifications of the administrative law judge's
proposed order.
He contends that when the
Commission received his returned order, it had a duty
to take additional steps to ensure that he got actual
notice of the amended order (i.e., the order that
required him to pay the full $500 penalty within 60
days or have his certificate revoked automatically).
This argument is unpersuasive. Section 54-6-14 of
the Motor Carrier Act mandates that all common and
contract motor carriers maintain on file with the
Commission "written designation of the name and
post office address of a person maintaining a
residence within this state upon whom service of any
process, notice, or order may be made under this
chapter/ Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-14 (1990). The
statute further provides, "Service of process shall be
by certified mail to the designated person at the
address filed." Id. The statute makes no reference to
any sort of personal service or actual notice
requirement. The most burdensome form of service
articulated is certified mail. Thus, we can infer that,
at most, the legislature intended that the Commission
be obligated to serve its orders by certified mail, not
by personal service.
[31 Despite the statute's apparent approval of serving
orders by certified mail, Anderson argues that he is
constitutionally entitled to actual notice of
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Commission orders. We do not believe that the
Constitution requires actual notice under these
circumstances.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank <£ Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313-14, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57, 94
L.Ed. 865 (1950), the United States Supreme Court
held that to comport with due process, notice must be
"reasonably calculated under all the circumstances" to
give interested parties an opportunity to protect their
interests. Under this standard, the proper inquiry
focuses on whether the agency "acted reasonably in
selecting means likely to inform persons affected, not
whether each [affected person] actually received
notice." Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646,
649 (2d Cir. 1988). To determine whether the agency
has acted reasonably in choosing a method of notice,
we balance the interest sought to be protected against
the interest of the agency.
Tulsa Professional
Collection Servs. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484,
108 S.Ct. 1340, 1344, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988);
Carbon v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1273-74 (Utah 1987).
In undertaking this analysis, we focus on whether the
method of service strikes a reasonable balance
between the interests of the agency and the affected
individual, see Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 484, 108 S.Ct. at
1344, while keeping in mind that the state's burden is
less onerous in administrative proceedings.
See
Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 602
(Utah 1980) (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he sufficiency
of 'notice' fDr due process purposes is more limited in
administrative matters than in other areas of the
law.").
In the instant case, Anderson's interest lies ia a
certificate of convenience and necessity for operating
a limousine service. It appears that the limousine
service is Ajoderson's source of livelihood. As such,
it represents a significant interest. On the other hand,
the agency has an interest in controlling the level of
its administrative burden in delivering orders to
parties. The current practice of delivering orders via
certified mail does not place an undue burden on the
Commission. Unlike personal service, which would
require substantial time and expense, certified mad is
far less costly and less personnel-intensive;
nevertheless, it is a reliable method of notice. See,
e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 397-98, 34
S.Ct. 779, 784, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914) (commenting
on skill of postal workers in effecting delivery);
Hoffman v. National Equip. Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d
987, 990 (4th Cir. 1981) (presuming notice-bearing
letters reach destination).
[4] Furthermore, the nature and purpose of the
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relationship between certificate holders and the
Commission support the adequacy of this type of
notice. When the Commission grants a certificate of
convenience and necessity, it gives an individual the
authority to operate in a designated *826 business
(e.g., common carriers). This certificate does not
represent an unrestricted right. Rather, the
Commission may impose reasonable conditions with
which the certificate holder must comply in return for
the privilege of retaining the certificate. See, e.g.,
73B CJ.S. Public Utilities § 69, at 328-29 (1983)
("[CJommission may, in the public interest ... annex
reasonable conditions or limitations to the certificate
of convenience and necessity."); 53 CJ.S. Licenses
§ 41, at 383 (1987) (holder must comply with
conditions imposed to be entitled to license); 51
Am.Jur.2d Licenses and Permits § 45, at 52 (1970)
("[CJontinuance of license privileges may require the
satisfaction of certain requirements.").
The
Commission regulates and supervises the certificate
holder to ensure that the holder is in compliance with
the conditions of his or her certificate.
This
regulatory function requires ongoing communication
between the Commission and certificate holders; it is
entirely reasonable to require certificate holders to
make themselves available to receive regular
communications. Thus, the ongoing nature of the
relationship with certificate holders suggests that the
Commission's burden in effecting notice is somewhat
less onerous in this context than it might be outside
the regulatory setting.
[5] In addition, the agency also has a significant
interest in ensuring that parties do not delay or
subvert the administrative process by willfully evading
notice. If an actual notice standard were required for
delivery of Commission orders, parties might be
encouraged to evade notice. A party fearing an
adverse outcome could simply refuse to claim his or
her mail and then avoid personal service. Such a
result would be unacceptable.
Although some
individuals may fail to receive notice through no fault
of their own, it would be extremely burdensome to
require the Commission to undertake factual
determinations of willfulness and fault in every failure
to receive notice.
The legislature appears to have recognized the risk
of willful evasion. Consequently, it has placed the
bulk of the burden of ensuring notice on the certificate
holders. Section 54-6-14 of the Motor Carrier Act
provides, "Every common and contract motor carrier
shall file with the commission a written designation of
the name and post office address of a person
maintaining a residence within this state upon whom
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service of any process, notice, or order may be
made." Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-14 (1990). This
requirement of rrmintaining a current address on file
with the Commission, with the implicit corollary of
making a diligent effort to collect mail sent to that
address, is a reasonable burden on the benefit of
holding a certificate of convenience and necessity.
This is particularly true for notice involving orders.
Orders generally are sent after the parry has been
involved in some proceeding before the Commission
or administrative law judge. Thus, the party is aware
that actions are or may be pending. The party is
aware that communications from the Commission
likely will ensue, and therefore, the party should be
diligent in retrieving any correspondence from the
Commission.
Given the potential administrative burden and the
risk of willful evasion inherent in an actual notice
standard, we believe that the use of certified mail to
deliver Commission orders strikes a proper balance
between the interests of the certificate holder and the
interests of the agency. Although certified mail will
not ensure actual notice in all cases, it is a method
reasonably calculated to inform certificate holders of
Commission orders.
IV. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS CONDUCT
[6] Anderson contends that the Commission acted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner by amending the
administrative law judge's recommended order. He
argues that because the Commission members were
not present at the hearing and thus could not observe
Anderson's demeanor, they did not have a sufficient
basis for amending the administrative law judge's
recommendations. We disagree. The Commission,
after reviewing the record and considering Anderson's
history of violations, *827 concluded that the full
$500 fine was warranted and that if it was not paid
within 60 days, his certificate would be revoked. The
Commission's penalty was well within the range of
penalties allowed under section 54-6a-4(l). In fact, a
$500 penalty is at the low end of the permissible
scale.
Considering Anderson's long history of
violations, it was reasonable for the Commission to
impose a stiffer penalty than the administrative law
judge recommended.
Thus, we hold that the
Commission's action was neither arbitrary nor
capricious.
V. ESTOPPEL
[7] Finally, Anderson contends that the Commission
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should be estopped from revoking his certificate
because he had entered into an alleged settlement
agreement with an assistant attorney general. In
December 1990, the attorney general's office
instituted legal proceedings against Anderson for
failure to pay the fine on his prior violation (Docket
No. 90-841-01).
Subsequently, Anderson and an
assistant attorney general, Mr. Tanner, began
negotiations to settle all the fines Anderson owed.
(FN3) Neither the parties nor the record indicates the
exact nature of these negotiations. It does appear,
however, that while the negotiations were in progress,
the Commission revoked Anderson's certificate.
Anderson argues that certain representations were
made during the course of the negotiations that should
estop the Commission from revoking his certificate.
Anderson rests his claim on a letter his attorney sent
to Mr. Tanner on February 19, 1991, stating, "It is
my understanding from our previous telephone
conversations that if [my client] pays another $250.00
on or before May 9, 1991, then all of the matters
currently pending will be resolved." He makes no
further allegations of specific representations made to
him. Anderson's estoppel claim fails because it does
not meet the high standard of proof required for
estoppel against the government.
As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked
against a governmental entity. Utah State Univ. v.
Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). In
Utah, there is a limited exception to this general
principle for "unusual circumstances 'where it is plain
that the interests of justice so require.' " Eldredge v.
Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah
Ct.App.1990) (quoting Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d at 720).
This exception applies, however, only if "the facts
may be found with such certainty, and the injustice
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the
exception." Sutro <£ Co., 646 P.2d at 720.
The few cases in which Utah courts have permitted
estoppel against the government have involved veiy
specific written representations by authorized
government entities. For example, in Celebrity Club,
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d
689 (Utah 1979), an applicant for a liquor license
inquired whether its proposed location would comply
with a statutory requirement that it not be located
within "600 feet of any public or private school,
church, library, public playground or park...." Utah
Code Ann. § 16-6-13.5 (repealed 1985). The Liquor
Control Commission responded with a written
representation that "the location of the proposed liquor
store in your proposed private club facility satisfies
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the 600 foot requirement." Celebrity Club, Inc., 602
P.2d at 691.
In reliance on this explicit
representation, the applicant expended roughly
$200,000 to complete the club. In a subsequent
dispute over the issuance of the license, the court held
that the Commission was estopped from denying the
license for violation of the statute.
Similarly, in Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct.App.1990), a representative of
the Utah State Retirement Office assured a county
employee that he would receive credit toward
retirement for over six years of service he had
accrued prior to a temporary break in his employment
with the county. Representatives of the retirement
office made oral and written statements assuring
Eldredge *828. that he would be credited with the
years in question. Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 672-73.
Relying on these explicit representations, Eldredge
chose to participate in an early retirement option. The
court held that the county was later estopped from
denying Eldredge credit for the improperly credited
years. Id. ait 678.
These cases involved very clear, well-substantiated
representations by government entities. There was no
such representation here. All we have is Anderson's
claim, in his own attorney's letter, that some sort of
agreement may have been reached. Anderson points
to no specific statement or written representation
made by either the Commission or Mr. Tanner that
could rise to the standard required under Sutro & Co.
Consequently, his estoppel claim fails.
Anderson has not demonstrated that the Commission
failed to comply with the notice and hearing
requirements of section 54-6-41, that the
Commission's action was arbitrary or capricious, or
that the Commission should be estopped from
revoking his certificate.
Thus, we affirm the
Commission's revocation of Anderson's certificate.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

and

(FN1.) The parties did not brief or argue this case
under article I,§ 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Therefore, we do not analyze § 54-6-41 under the
State's due process clause.
(FN2.) In his brief, however, Anderson
acknowledges that due process does not "necessarily
require a hearing at any particular point in the
administrative proceeding as long as the requisite
hearing is held before the final order becomes
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effective. * Vali Convalescent & Care Inst. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 649 P.2d 33, 36 (Utah 1982).
(FN3.) Although it is unclear from the record, it
appears that by this time, Anderson had learned of
the Commission's amendment of the administrative
law judge's proposed order.
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4 Ed. Law Rep. 1311
Supreme Court of Utah.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE
AND APPLIED SCIENCE, a
Utah body politic and corporate, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
SUTRO Sc CO.; Bear Stearns & Co.; Hornblower &
Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner &
Smith; Bosworth, Sullivan & Co.; and Shearson,
Hammill&
Co., Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
Phillip A. BULLEN, et al., Thinl-Party Defendants.
Nos. 16274, 16275, 16276, 16277, 16278, 16279,
16285, 16286,
16287, 16288, 16289, 16290, 16291, 16292, 16294,
16295, 16296 and 16297.
May 5, 1982.
Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied
Science sued stock brokers to recover losses sustained
as result of program of investments carried on through
the brokers, in which brokers filed counterclaims and
third-party claims against university officials and
members of its institution council seeking indemnity.
The First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy
Christofferson, J., denied defendants' motions to
dismiss, granted plaintiffs motion for partial
summary judgment and dismissed counterclaims on
third-party actions.
Brokers' petitions for
intermediate appeal were granted. The Supreme
Court, Crockett, Retired J., held that: (1) although
lawfulness of investing state funds in common stocks
was in doubt, plaintiff was not necessarily estopped
from repudiating officials' representations that they
were authorized to engage in common stock
transactions; (2) absent allegation of bad faith or
willful intention of wrongdoing, University officials
and council members were entitled to cloak of
qualified immunity; (3) activities of Logan banks on
behalf of nonresident brokers was sufficient to subject
latter to personal jurisdiction; and (4) venue lay in
Cache County where delivery of stocks and payment
therefore occurred.
Remanded for further proceedings.
West Headnotes

[1] Appeal and Error <@^846(5)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k844 Review Dependent on Mode of Trial in
Lower Court
30k846 Trial by Court in General
30k846(5) Necessity of Finding Facts.
Where rulings on appeal, i.e., denial of defendants'
motions to dismiss, granting of plaintiffs motions to
partial summary judgment on ground that defendants
were liable as a matter of law and dismissing
counterclaims and third-party actions, were made
without giving defense an opportunity to present
evidence and have findings of fact, reviewing court
accepted defendants' assertions as true although the
exposition of facts in that light was no indication as to
how the disputed facts would be resolved on trial.
[2] Brokers®^ 19
65 —
65IV Duties and Liability to Principal
65kl9 Nature of Broker's Obligation.
Stock brokers have an especially high degree of care
to ascertain the authority of a trustee dealing with
public hinds.
[3] Estoppel <@^>62.1
156 —
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or
Public Officers
156k62.1 In General.
In applying estoppel against a government entity a
distinction is drawn between contracts or activities
which are either mala in se or which are strictly
prohibited by statute and thus may be strongly against
public policy, as compared to activities which, though
not authorized by law, are not inherently evil and in
the former class of cases, it is universally held that no
estoppel will lie whereas in activities which are
merely ultra vires the courts are more likely to allow
such a defense and this is also true of situations when
the government entity engages in proprietary or
business activities.
[4] Estoppel <®==>62.1
156.—
156m Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or
Public Officers
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156k62.1 In General.
Rule precluding assertion of estoppel against a
government is sound and generally should be applied,
except only in appropriate circumstances where the
interests of justice mandate an exception to that
general rule, and in cases where such an issue arises
the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts
may be found with such certainty and the injustice to
be suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the
exception and doubt should be resolved in favor of
permitting the party to have a trial of the issue.
[5] Estoppel <®^62.2(2)
156 —
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or
Public Officers
156k62.2 States and United States
156k62.2(2) Particular State Officers, Agencies
or Proceedings.
It could not be said as a matter of law that defendant
stock brokers were liable for losses sustained by State
University of Agriculture and Applied Science as
result of program of common stock investments
carried on through the brokers where brokers
contended that they requested and received resolutions
of institutional council as to its authority to invest in
common stocks notwithstanding that by law such
investments may have been prohibited, and whether
the University was estopped from repudiating its
representations of authority was to be determined
from the facts. U.C.A.1953, 33-1-1.
[6] Judgment <®=^181(4)
228 —
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228kl81 Grounds for Summary Judgment
228kl81(4) Necessity That Right to Judgment Be
Free from Doubt.
In view of constitutional guarantee of access to the
courts for protection of rights and redress of wrongs,
summary judgment, which denies opportunity for
trial, should be granted only when it clearly appears
that there is no reasonable probability that the party
moved against could prevail. Const. Art. 1, § 11.
[7] Officers and Public Employees <®^114
283 —
283DI Rights, Powers, Duties, and Liabilities
283kll4 Liabilities for Official Acts.
Generally recognized doctrine of law is that public
officials are protected by qualified immunity from
suits growing out of performance of lawfully
authorized discretionary duties, so long as they are
Copyright (c) West Group 2000
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acting in good, faith and are not guilty of any willful or
intentional wrongdoing.
[8] Officers and Public Employees <@^114
283 -—
283III Rights, Powers, Duties, and Liabilities
283kll4 Liabilities for Official Acts.
When a public official acts in good faith in
performance of discretionary duties he is not liable in
damages merely because he may make a mistake in
judgment.
[9] Colleges and Universities <®=>7
81 —
81k7 Governing Boards and Officers.
Officials of the Utah State University of Agriculture
and Applied Science and individual members of the
institution council could not be held liable to
indemnify *715 defendant stock brokers for any
damages that might be assessed against brokers in
university's damages action arising out of investment
of state funds in common stock where there was no
allegation that council members acted in bad faith or
committed any willful or intentional wrong and in
spite of errors in judgment no one questioned that
council members acted in accordance with their then
best judgment for the benefit of the institution.
U.C.A.1953, 33-1-1.
[10] Principal and Agent <®=^15
308 —
3081 The Relation
3081(A) Creation and Existence
308kl5 Joint Principals.
It is not necessarily true that a party acting as agent
in a transaction must be exclusively agent of one party
or the other and when he is requested and performs
duty for each, with knowledge and consent of both, he
may well be considered as agent for each for the
particular services he renders that principal.
[11] Courts <®=* 12(2.5)
106 —
1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction in
General
106kl0 Jurisdiction of the Person
106kl2 Domicile or Residence of Party
106kl2(2) Actions by or Against Nonresidents;
"Long-Arm" Jurisdiction in General
106kl2(2.5) Contacts with Forum State.
(Formerly 106kl2(2))
Insofar as Utah banks performed duties for and at
direction of nonresident brokers the banks acted as
brokers agent and the number of transactions was
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over brokers
in state University's action to recover for losses
sustained as result of program of investments carried
on to the brokers, with two Logan banks authorized to
receive stock certificates sent by brokers, to be
exchanged for proceeds of drafts payable to brokers.
[12] Venue <®^>8.2
401 —
4011 Nature or Subject of Action
401k8 Actions for Torts
401k8.2 Particular Torts.
(Formerly 401k8(2))
Although Salt Lake County was where defendant
brokers accepted orders and executed purchases of
stock for plaintiff, venue of action to recover losses
sustained as a result of program of investments
carried on through the brokers laid in Cache County
where the transactions were actually consummated by
delivery of stock and payment therefor in Logan
banks and such delivery and payment constituted the
alleged wrongful acts.
[13] Appeal and Error <@=^965
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k963 Proceedings Preliminary to Trial
30k965 Change of Venue.
[See headnote text below]
[13] Venue <®=^42
401 —
401III Change of Venue or Place of Trial
401k42 Discretion of Court.
When venue may properly he in more than one
county the trial court has considerable discretion in
acting on a motion for change and its ruling will not
be disturbed absent a clear abuse thereof.
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party defendants.
CROCKETT, Retired Justice:
These actions were brought on behalf of Utah State
University of Agriculture and Applied Science (herein
referred to as USU) against the five named
defendants, who are brokers and dealers in stocks and
securities (herein referred to as the brokers), to
recover losses sustained by USU as a result of a
program of investments carried on through the
brokers between September, 1970, and March, 1973.
The brokers denied liability, filed counterclaims and
also filed third-party claims against the named USU
officials and members of the USU Institutional
Council (herein referred to as the Council members)
seeking indemnity for any losses that may be assessed
against the brokers.
Pursuant to motions, the trial court entered the
following orders: denied defendants' motions to
dismiss; granted USU's motion for partial summary
judgment against defendant brokers, ruling that they
are liable as a matter of law; and dismissed the
defendants' counterclaims and their third-party actions
against the Institutional Council members. This Court
granted the brokers' petitions for intermediate appeal,
in which these actions are combined.
[1] In view of the fact that the rulings under attack
were made by the trial court as a matter of law,
without giving the brokers an opportunity to present
evidence and have findings of fact made thereon, for
the purpose of this review we accept their assertions
as true, ([FN1]) but we expressly note that in our
exposition of facts in that light we do not desire to
indicate any view as to how the disputed issues of fact
may be resolved upon a trial thereof.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
USU, plaintiff and respondent.

Motivated by a desire to better manage USU's
financial resources, in the summer of 1970 its
Institutional Council decided upon and launched what
is referred to as an "aggressive program" of investing
in stocks, which led to opening accounts with the
defendant brokers. It adopted resolutions authorizing
dealings in stocks and securities by its vice-president,
Dee A. Broadbent, and Donald A. Catron, controller.
The brokers aver that it was at the request of these
USU officials that they engaged in dealing in the
stocks.

Robert S. Campbell, Jr., H. Wayne Wadsworth,
Michael F. Heyrend, Salt Lake City, John W.
Morrison, David R. Melton, Chicago, 111., Lyle W.
Hillyard, Logan, Darwin Hansen, Bountiful, for third-

[2] It is not to be questioned that the defendants,
who are licensed to render service as brokers, must be
deemed to have and use specialized knowledge,
experience and integrity in rendering that service; and

*717 Harold G. Christensen, R. Brent Stephens,
Dee V. Benson, Salt Lake City, for Bosworth.
Keith E. Taylor, Daniel M. Allred, Kathlene W.
Lowe, Salt Lake City, for Sutro.
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more specifically here, that they have an especially
high degree of care to ascertain the authority of a
trustee (plaintiff) dealing with public hinds. Upon
trial, there will be an issue as to what those standards
are, and the extent to which the brokers discharged
the high responsibilities which the law imposes upon
them. The brokers contend that they discharged their
duties in accordance with the standards of their
business, in ascertaining the authority of USU to so
invest its funds; that they requested and received the
resolutions of the Council indicating such authority;
that they acted in good faith upon the resolutions and
assurances given to them as to the University's
authority to invest its funds for its potential benefit;
and that they did nothing other than "to scrupulously,
fairly, and diligently carry out instructions given
them" by the Council and its agents authorized for
that purpose; and that in the hundreds of *718
transactions over a period of 3 years they acted only
as conduits, transferring the stocks from various
principals to USU and vice versa, and only in
relatively few instances were themselves principals,
selling the stocks to USU.
During the first two years, while the stock market
was rising, the investment program prospered and
everyone concerned seemed to be happy about the
situation. However, in the fall of 1972 there was a
recession in the stock market and there were
substantial declines in values of stocks owned by the
University. In late November, 1972, during the
course of an independent audit, the Attorney General
was requested for an opinion as to the legality of the
investments. On December 15, 1972, he issued an
opinion that it was not lawful for the University to
invest state funds in securities not expressly
authorized in Sec. 33-1-1, U.C.A. 1953, which does
not include common stocks. Acting thereon, at its
next meeting in January, 1973, the Board of Higher
Education instructed the USU Council by letter to
liquidate all securities not expressly authorized by that
statute. However, it appears that Mr. Catron did not
fully comply with that mandate immediately; and that
information was not officially transmitted to the
brokers until March of 1973.
As a result of the losses incurred in the liquidation
process, these suits were brought against the
defendant brokers seeking to recoup losses running
into millions of dollars on the ground that their
contracts with the University had been illegal and
void.
Principal among the issues raised by the brokers is
their contention that the trial court erred in ruling that
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they could not assert estoppel against USU, a
governmental institution, and that they are liable for
its losses as a matter of law. They argue that this
results in a grave injustice to them procedurally: it
allows plaintiff USU to repudiate its representations
made to them; to have the advantage of their services
without compensation; to accept the benefits of the
investment program and disavow the losses; then to
arbitrarily impose the losses on defendant brokers; all
this without giving the brokers any opportunity to
prove their contentions.
The brokers essay the
position that their evidence will convince any
fairminded trier of facts that to apply the rule that
estoppel does not apply against the government would
result in such obvious and serious injustice as to bring
this case within the well-recognized exception to that
general rule.
We havfe no doubt about the soundness nor the
salutary purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is
not assertable against the government or governmental
institutions. ([FN2]) There are good and sufficient
reasons for that rule, including the safeguarding of the
interests of the public, which are often somewhat in
hazard because of the vagaries of political tides,
frequent changes of public officials, the possibility of
collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by
law, then suing for the value of goods furnished or
services rendered. Notwithstanding our approval of
that nile, like most general rules, there are exceptions
when its rigid application would defeat, rather than
serve, the higher purpose that all rules are intended to
serve: that of doing justice. ([FN3]) The rule is
therefore applied when it will serve that purpose. But
in unusual circumstances, when it is plainly apparent
that its application would result in injustice, and there
would be no substantial adverse effect on public
policy, the courts will honor the higher purpose of
doing justice by invoking the exception, rather than
departing from that desired objective in slavish
adherence to a general rule. ([FN4])
•719 [3] In addressing the question whether under
any state of facts that may be found in this case the
defense of estoppel may be applied, there are some
observations to be made. The first is that there is a
distinction to be drawn between contracts or activities
which are either malum in se, or which are strictly
prohibited by statute, and thus may be strongly against
public policy, as compared to activities such as those
of concern here which, though not authorized by law,
are not inherently evil. In the former class of cases, it
is quite universally held that no estoppel will he
against the government, whereas in activities which
are merely ultra vires the courts are more likely to
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allow such a defense; and this is also true of situations
when the governmental entity engages in proprietary
or business activities. ([FN5]) In this case, the
activities with which we are concerned were business
activities. That activities such as those in question
here were ultra vires has been adjudged in our case of
First Equity Corp. v. Utah State University, ([FN6])
but the plaintiffs reliance on that case as squarely
supporting its position here is misplaced. The holding
there was that because the contract was ultra vires the
broker could not enforce it, quite different from the
situation confronted in this case.
Further pursuing the inquiry as to whether these
contracts between plaintiff USU and the defendant
brokers should be regarded as utterly illegal and void,
as compared to being simply not authorized by law, it
seems helpful to figuratively "try the shoe on the other
foot." Suppose in an instance where a broker had
made a substantial stock purchase at USU's request
and held it for a few months, there had been an
increase in value with a profit of say $100,000, and
that the broker had refused to remit and defended on
the ground that the contract was completely void. The
rejection of that contention seems so obviously just as
to hardly require stating.
A decision which recognized that there are
sometimes circumstances where the interests of justice
demand allowing the doctrine of estoppel to be
asserted against the government was issued over 100
years ago by the United States Supreme Court in
Hackett v. City of Ottawa. ([FN7]) There the city
officials had represented that bonds were issued for a
lawful purpose and issued them under the city's seal,
but it was later determined that their issuance had not
been in accordance with lawful authority. It was held
that because such obvious unfairness would otherwise
result to purchasers of the bonds, the city was
estopped from asserting that they had been unlawfully
issued and were void.
Another case which we regard as helpful and
representing sound reasoning on this subject is that of
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch. ([FN8]) After
reviewing the case law, the court stated that estoppel
should be allowed as a defense against the government
where to do otherwise would work a serious injustice,
and the public interest would not be unduly damaged
by the interposition of that defense. In its discussion,
the court engaged in what has been referred to as a
"balancing of equities" test and concluded that under
the facts of that case a grave injustice would result if
the government were not held responsible for the
information it had given the Ranch and which the
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latter had relied on; and that under the circumstances
there would be no serious adverse effect either on
public policy or the interest of the government by
permitting the Ranch partners to retain the funds they
had received.
*720 In the later case of United States v. Wharton,
([FN9]) the court reiterated the standard set forth in
Lazy FC Ranch.
The defendants asserted the
government was estopped by the affirmative
misconduct on the part of government officials who
gave them incorrect information. The court noted the
precaution that not every form of official
misinformation would be sufficient to estop the
government, but where advice given was so closely
related to basic fairness and the decision-making
process, the government should be estopped from
disavowing the representation made because to do so
would work a serious injustice on the defendant and
the interest of the public would not be unduly
threatened or damaged.
Our own Court has similarly long since taken its
position in accord with the doctrine just discussed, of
looking through the rigidity of a general rule to see
and apply an exception where it is plain that the
interests of justice so require. In the case of Wall v.
Salt Lake City, ([FN10]) the city by affirmative acts
and representations had allowed the plaintiffs to take
possession of property which was difficult for the city
to utilize as a street. In reliance thereon, the plaintiffs
had possessed and cared for the property for over 20
years. The Court held that the city was estopped from
repudiating its representations and reclaiming the
property. The ruling in the Wall case was restated
with approval in the later case of Tooele City v.
Elkington, ([FN 11]) though the Court was not
persuaded that the factual requirements for invoking
estoppel against the city were met.
We have recently had occasion to confront another
situation where egregious injury would result unless
estoppel was applied against a governmental
institution. In Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control
Commission, ([FN 12]) the plaintiff club had made
large expenditures, relying on assurances of an
official of the Liquor Commission, which this Court
held could not be repudiated to the injury of the club.
[4] [5] [6] We regard the authorities referred to above
as well reasoned, with which our sense of justice is in
harmony, and supportive of the well-recognized policy
of the law as earlier set forth herein, to the effect that
the rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel
against the government is sound and generally should
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be applied, except only in appropriate circumstances
as hereinabove stated, where the interests of justice
mandate an exception to that general rule. ([FN 13])
In cases where such an issue arises, the critical
inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be
found with such certainty, and the injustice to be
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the
exception. And in case there is doubt on such
matters, it should be resolved in favor of permitting
the party to have a trial of the issue, as opposed to
summary rejection thereof.
([FN 14]) Whether
injustice of that serious character would be the result
in this case can only be determined on the facts which
may be found from the evidence to be presented on
the issues in dispute.
Taking the brokers' averments and representations
as true, we cannot conclude with assurance that there
is no reasonable probability that they can meet the test
stated herein. It is therefore our conclusion that it
was improper to adjudge them liable as a *721
matter of law. In relation to the issues raised in this
case, it is deemed desirable and necessary that an
opportunity be afforded the defendant brokers and the
plaintiff USU to present such evidence as they desire
in support of their respective contentions as to the
propriety of their conduct, and that a trier of facts
make a determination thereon.
The second issue of major importance is the
defendant brokers' attack on the trial court's dismissal
of their third-party complaints for indemnification
from members of the Institutional Council for any
damages that may be assessed against the brokers.
We first note that the brokers state in their brief that
they are not appealing from the dismissal of their
third-party actions against the Institutional Council as
an entity, but appeal only the dismissal as to the
individuals involved.
The proposition upon which the brokers base their
third-party complaints is that if an agent (themselves)
is held liable for actions in which he is innocent, and
which his principal (USU) directed him to commit,
the principal must reimburse the agent for the
damages incurred. ([FN15]) Their averments are that
the Council members were all well educated,
experienced and sophisticated in such matters; that as
trustees of a public trust they were charged with
knowledge as to the extent of their authority and with
a high degree of responsibility in discharging their
duties; and that in case of any uncertainty they had
ready and free access to the advice of the Attorney
General; but that they nevertheless negligently failed
in their duty and made the representations hereinabove
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set forth to the broker-dealers, who aver that they
were innocent agents in the transactions.
This
position might have merit if they had not been dealing
with a governmental institution and public officials.
[7] [8] The generally recognized doctrine of law is
that public officials are protected by a qualified
immunity from suits growing out of the performance
of lawfully authorized discretionary duties, so long as
they are acting in good faith and are not guilty of any
willful or intentional wrongdoing. ([FN 16]) The
underlying reasons for this are that such protection is
in accord with the interests of justice; is necessary as
a matter of public policy in order not to deter persons
of capability and integrity from accepting the
responsibilities of public office; and that when they
are so serving they should be free to exercise their
judgment without fear of damage suits because
someone thinks they made a mistake in judgment.
Whenever confronted by such an issue, this Court has
consistently aligned itself with the doctrine just stated
and has ruled that when a public official is so acting in
good faith in performing his discretionary duties he is
not liable in damages simply because he may make a
mistake in judgment. ([FN 17])
[9] The defendant brokers do not allege that the
Council members acted in bad faith, nor that they
committed any willful or intentional wrong. This is
advisedly so because it is plainly apparent that there
would be no basis for support on any such charge. In
spite of errors in judgment, now so plainly revealed
by hindsight, no one questions that the Council
members acted in accordance with their then best
judgment for the benefit of the institution they served,
with little other advantage to themselves than the
satisfaction of having rendered a worthwhile public
service.
On the basis of what has been stated above, it is our
conclusion that the trial court was justified in
dismissing the defendant *722. brokers' third-party
complaints against the University officials and Council
members; and that ruling is affirmed.
[10] [11] The nonresident brokers (except Merrill
Lynch, which has an office in Salt Lake City) also
contend that no personal jurisdiction was acquired
over them. There are a number of significant facts to
be noted which have a bearing on that question. The
brokers advertise in the public media soliciting
business here; they conversed regularly with Mr.
Catron, either calling him or accepting his collect
calls about the stock transactions. Two banks in
Logan were authorized to receive the stock certificates
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sent by the brokers, to be exchanged for the proceeds
of drafts payable to the brokers. Upon the purchase
of stocks ordered by the plaintiff, the broker would
send a confirmation of purchase slip, and monthly
would send a statement of account.
There is a fallacy in the brokers' argument in that
they assume that because the banks that handled the
plaintiffs funds and were designated by it to receive
the stock certificates and pay drafts therefor, the
banks were exclusively the agents of the plaintiff. It
is not necessarily always true that a party acting as an
agent in a transaction must be exclusively the agent of
one party or the other. When he is requested and
performs duties for each of the parties, with the
knowledge and consent of both, he may very well be
considered as an agent for each for the particular
services he renders that principal. ([FN 18]) Insofar as
the Logan banks performed duties for and by direction
of the defendant brokers, they were acting as the
brokers' agents. That being so, there is ample
justification for the trial court's holding that they
conducted substantial and continuous activities in this
state sufficient to subject them to the jurisdiction of its
court. ([FN19])
[12][13] Two of the defendants, Merrill Lynch and
Bosworth-Sullivan, also contend that the trial court
erred in denying their motions for change of venue
from Cache County to Salt Lake County. Their
position is that that is where the alleged causes of
action arose because that is where they accepted the
orders and executed the purchases of stock for
plaintiff. However, we see no reason to disagree with
the view adopted by the trial court that the
transactions were actually consummated in the
delivery of the stock and the payment therefor in the
Logan banks; that this constituted the alleged
wrongful acts; and that consequently the venue of the
action was properly laid in Cache County. Moreover,
assume that there may be some merit to these
defendants' argument that venue should properly have
been laid in Salt Lake County. When venue may
properly lie in more than one county, the trial court
has considerable latitude of discretion in acting on a
motion for change; and his ruling will not be disturbed
in the absence of a clear abuse thereof. ([FN20]) We
are not persuaded that there was any error or abuse of
discretion in denying defendants' motions.
Other issues raised have been considered and are
deemed to be without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion.
This case is remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with the views expressed in
this decision. No costs awarded.
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HALL, C. J., STEWART and HOWE, JJ., and
GEORGE E. BALLIF, District Judge, concur.
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., do not participate
herein.
(FN1.) Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 Utah
2d 156, 434 P.2d 758 (1967).
(FN2.) Breitling Bros. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc.,
Utah, 597 P.2d 869 (1979).
(FN3.) Cf. Lord Mansfield's dictum: Let justice be
done, though the heavens fall.
(FN4.) That courts are increasingly applying this
exception, consistent with the trend toward holding
government and its agencies more responsible for
their actions. See Davis, Administrative Law of the
Seventies, s 17.01, and cases therein cited; Berger,
Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U.Chi.L.Rev.
680, 686 (1954); Newman, Should Official Advice
Be Reliable?-Proposals as to Estoppel and Related
Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 Colum.L.Rev.
374 (1953).
A recent decision of this Court
indicating agreement with the trend toward
narrowing governmental protection is Standiford v.
Salt Lake City, Utah, 605 P.2d 1230 (1980).
(FN5.) Nestman v. South Davis County Water
Improvement Dist., 16 Utah 2d 198, 201, 398 P.2d
203, 205 (1965). Accord, Gordon v. Provo City, 15
Utah 2d 287, 288-89, 391 P.2d 430 (1964).
*722_ (FN6.) Utah, 544 P.2d 887 (1975).
(FN7.) 99 U.S. 86, 25 L.Ed. 363 (1878).
(FN8.) 481 F.2d 985 (1973).
(FN9.) 514 F.2d 406 (1975).
(FN10.) 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917).
(FN11.) 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941).
(FN12.) 602 P.2d 689 (1979).
(FN 13.) Any apprehension about adverse effects on
the public interest of recognizing the defense of
estoppel is minimized here because after the public
notoriety concerning the controversy here involved,
our state legislature more clearly delineated the
power of the University to invest in securities. See
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s 51-7-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1974 Supp.
(FN14.) Sec. 11, Art. I, Utah Const, assures access
to the courts for the protection of rights and the
redress of wrongs; therefore, summary judgment,
which denies the opportunity of trial, should be
granted only when it clearly appears that there is no
reasonable probability the party moved against could
prevail. See Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and
Guar. Ins. Under., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685
(1965), and authorities therein cited.
(FN 15.) Citing Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73
P. 512 (1903).
(FN16.) See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564,
575, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1341, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959);
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, at 343-344 (1973).
Eminent authorities in accord, Prosser, The Law of
Torts, s 132; 4 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations,
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s 12.208.
(FN 17.) Anderson v. Granite School District, 17
Utah 2d 405, 413 P.2d 597 (1966); Hjorth v.
Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952);
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367
(1968).
(FN18.) See Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., Utah,
530 P.2d 815 (1974), and authorities therein cited; 3
AmJur.2d Agency, s 234 (1962).
(FN19.) Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, Utah, 608
P.2d 244; Brown v. Carness Corp., 611 P.2d 378;
Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., Utah, 610 P.2d
1307.
(FN20.) Chamblee v. Stocks, 9 Utah 2d 342, 344
P.2d 980 (1959).
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DALE WHEELER,

)
Plaintiff,

vs.
MARK R. MCPHERSON, and
KANE COUNTY SHERIFFS
DEPARTMENT,

;1

ORDER CHANGING VENUE

))
)
;
;
;

Civil No. 990502485
Judge G. Rand Beacham

Defendants. ]
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which was
supported a memorandum of points and authorities. Plaintiff responded with an opposing
memorandum, and Defendants then filed a reply memorandum.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court in the belief that the acts and omissions of
which he complains occurred in Washington County. Plaintiff now believes those acts and
omissions occurred in Kane County. Defendant moves for dismissal of the Complaint on the
basis of Rule 12 (b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-17,
which provides, in part:
Actions against a county may be brought in the county in which
the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave
granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any
county contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be
granted ex parte.

Under this statute, proper venue of this action is clearly in Kane County, not Washington
County, and any transfer from Kane County to Washington County or any other county
contiguous with Kane County must be made by a district court judge in Kane County. To
this extent, Defendants are entirely correct.
Rule 12 (b)(3) only provides, however, that a defense of improper venue "may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion" before filing a responsive pleading. It does not
necessarily provide for dismissal of a complaint for improper venue. Utah Code Ann. § 7813-8 provides that an action which is commenced in an improper venue may still be tried
there unless "the defendant at the time he answers or otherwise appears files a motion, in
writing, that the trial be had in the proper county." On the basis of this statute, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that "objection to venue is made by motion for change of place of
trial rather than by motion to dismissal [sic; may be error in "Utah Law on Disc"]." Cannon
v. Tuft. 3 Utah 2d 410, 285 P.2d 843,

(Utah 1955).

Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss is not the correct procedure for
challenging venue, and the motion should be denied on that basis. Doing so will leave the
case in a clearly improper venue under Section 63-30-17, however, at least until the district
court of Kane County considers whether to change venue to a contiguous county.1

*Even though Section 78-13-8 allows a case to proceed in an improper venue in the absence of a
timely motion to change venue, Section 63-30-17 appears to contradict that idea and require a case to be
filed and considered in the proper venue. This Court assumes that the specific venue provisions of Section
63-30-17 would supercede the general venue provisions of Section 78-13-8.
2

While Defendants' motion to dismiss cannot be granted, the Court will order, sua
sponte, that venue be changed, for the following reasons:
a.

Defendants have raised the issue of improper venue in a timely manner, but by
a defective procedure.

b.

This Court does not wish to encourage or entertain quibbles of the sort
involved in Cannon v. Tuft, as to whether Defendants' filing of the wrong
motion foreclosed themfromfiling a proper motion to change venue.

c.

Section 63-30-17 requires that this case begin in Kane County, in which the
claim arose.2

Consequently, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that venue of this action be changed to
the Sixth District Court for Kane County.
Dated this A ^ day of August, 2000.

JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM

defendants also note that Kane County may be the proper defendant, rather than the named
Defendants. If Defendants are correct, that would give another basis for venue in Kane County. That
issue, and the issue of the adequacy of the summonses, may be resolved after transfer to the proper venue.
3

Certificate of Mailing or Hand Delivery
I hereby certify that on this

3 day of £burt,, 2000,1 provided true and correct

copies of the foregoing ORDER to each of the attorneys named below by placing a copy in
the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Ronald E. Dalby
Attorney for Plaintiff
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salk Lake City, Utah 84107
John Warren May
Attorney for Defendants
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT

v#

ADDENDUM C

*D

PETER STIRBA (Bar No 3118)
KIMBERLY D. WASHBURN (Bar No. 6681)
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8300

•-•

i,
" 'I

/

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, WASHINGTON COUNTY
DALE WHEELER,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No 000600048

MARK R. McPHERSON and KANE
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,

Judge David L Mower

Defendants.
The above captioned matter came before the Court on the motion of the Defendants' to
dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint. The Court, having considered the submissions of the parties, the
file herein and good cause otherwise appearing, hereby enters the following Order:
The Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed.
DATED this 2 - day of

*£&&

2001.
BY THE COURT

2As_

JLE DAVID L. MOWER
District Court Judge

NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
Please take notice that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, that this proposed ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS will be adopted by the Court unless you file an objection in writing withinfive(5) days
from the date of service of this Notice.

5^ day of January, 2001.

DATED this _^

STIRB A & HATHAWAY

\A.W^—-

Kimberly E^Was!snburn
Attorneys for Defendants

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s 5 _ _ day of January, 2001,1 caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS,
by the method indicated below, to the following:
Ronald E. Dalby
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS &
DALBY, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

()
()
()
()

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

r f

\faiA
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SIXTH DJc:i ? ; l0 - r r^r~Oo.A

DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052

DALE WHEELER,

COURT'S DECISION
Plaintiff,

Case No. 000600048
Assigned Judge: David L. Mower

vs.
MARK R. MCPHERSON, an individual, and
KANE COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT.
Defendant.

Defendants have made a motion to dismiss. Although an Answer has been filed, it will
be disregarded because, insofar as any motion to dismiss is concerned, the Complaint is
presumed to be true.
The basis of the motion is that the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed. More
specifically, the defendants claim (1) that a particular notice is a prerequisite to the filing of the
complaint, (2) that the notice was not given, and (3) that therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to
proceed.
Notice is a prerequisite.
Any person having a claim ... shall file a written notice .... Section
63-30-11(2), Utah Code.
There is a deadline for giving notice.
A claim ... is barred unless notice of claim is filed ... within one
year after the claim arises .... Section 63-30-13, Utah Code.

C O U R T S DECISION, Case number 000600048, Page -2There is a required method for giving notice.
The notice of claim shall be ... directed and delivered ... to the
county clerk .... Section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(i)(B), Utaih Code.
The claim arose on September 27, 1998. Complaint, paragraph 3.
The time period "within one year" is to be computed according to Rule 6, Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure. The strict computation does not appear to be an issue here, so I will assume
it to be September 27, 1999.
There was no notice directed and delivered to the county clerk by September 27,1999.
Affidavit of Karla Johnson, Kane County Clerk.
I conclude that no proper notice was given and that the "bar" referred to in section 63-3013 was triggered.
The phrase "a claim is barred" means the same as "the Court has no jurisdiction to
proceed".
The complaint makes no claims against Mr. McPherson as an individual. In fact, all the
claims in the complaint against him are for actions done while acting as a law enforcement
officer of Kane County. The specific references to him are as follows:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)

... a sheriffs deputy ... (complaint, paragraph 3);
... to chase a speeding ... vehicle (complaint, paragraph 3);
... the deputy ... (complaint, paragraph 3);
... the Defendants are a law enforcement agency and officer (complaint, paragraph
4);
Defendant was in the scope and course of his duty .... (complaint, paragraph 4).

COURT'S DECISION, Case number 000600048, Page -3DECISION
The Plaintiff is barred from pursuing his complaint for failure to give the required notice.
The motion to dismiss should be granted. Mr. Stirba or Mr. Guelker are to prepare an
appropriate order implementing this decision and to submit it for execution by following the
procedure set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration.
Dated this

'"

day of November, 2000.

David L. Mower
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

VV day of November 2000, a copy of the COURTS
each of the follmviflsrb^Uhemethod indicated: (Mail, in Per^ottfFax)

ION was sent to

Addressee
Jim R. Scarth
P.O. Box 160
St. George,-*Ff 84770

M

Rebecca Wal
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-081

Method

m

y
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Clerk

r\b

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the S%Ta' d a y o f December, 2000 a copy of the COURT'S DECISION was sent to
each of the following by the method indicated: (Mail, in Person, Fax)
Addressee

Method

Ronald E. Dalby
[fA]
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

Addressee
Peter Sirba
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810

VUs&J$<6
Clerk

Method
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